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ABSTRACT 
This thesis follows the progress of two controversial development projects in an 
historic waterfront precinct in the city of Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. The thesis 
examines the public participation processes in these developments and compares 
the effectiveness of public involvement with that found in a review of literature on 
public participation in planning. A brief outline of participation in the United States, 
Great Britain and Australia and its evolution is included. The dilemmas of public 
participation, including the lack of opportunities for 'real' participation and the 
perceived benefits for those who actually participate, are highlighted. Some 
recommendations are provided to guide authorities and participants in applying 
participation principles to planning proposals. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. An explanation of the format is appropriate. 
Chapter 1 introduces Sullivans Cove to the reader and describes the method of the 
thesis. It establishes Sullivans Cove as an important historic precinct with a unique 
heritage that is under pressure from development proposals. This thesis is submitted 
at a time when heritage values are undergoing a resurgence in popularity. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of contemporary literature on public participation to 
be found in relevant journals and other publications. This chapter forms the basis 
from which analysis of the case studies proceed. The overseas experience 
presented in this chapter is related, in subsequent chapters, to two development 
projects in Sullivans Cove, Tasmania, Australia. 
Chapters 3 and 4 form the main body of data for this thesis. The data is discussed in 
the section Analysis of Participation found at the end of both chapters. This 
discussion is consolidated and further analysed in chapter 5. Chapter 5 also includes 
final recommendations arising from the findings of this thesis. 
The essence of this thesis and its line of argument can be traced without detailed 
consideration of the case studies presented in chapters 3 and 4. The Summary and 
Analysis of Participation found at the end of each case study will inform the reader, in 
sufficient detail, of the sequence of events in these two developments. The case 
studies are included so that the historical perspective is not lost to future 
generations. This thesis, as far as the author is aware, is the only documented 
history of events for these two controversial developments in Sullivans Cove. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Sullivens Cove and Various Interests 
The future of Sullivans Cove as a historical site is under seige. 
Indeed, the battle to preserve its unique buildings, facilities, 
character and ambience already may have been lost 	 
The fundamental prerequisite for the conservation of a 
significant place is that its form and character, being of 
historic, architectural, social, scientific or aesthetic importance, 
should be preserved and enhanced. Once the rate of 
change in that character or fabric of a place becomes so rapid 
that it no longer feels familiar, then that value is lost, usually 
forever (The Mercury; 26/8/87). 
Sullivans Cove is Hobart's waterfront 'doorstep' and a principal site of Tasmania's 
early colonial development. Hobart was founded, at Sullivans Cove, in 1804 by 
Lieutenant David Collins. The urban character of Sullivans Cove became an integral 
part of Hobart's identity. It has been acclaimed for its architectural charm and is one 
of the city's unique attractions. 
Hobart has been described (The Bulletin; 26/4/88) as being second only to Sydney in 
Australian history, and in many ways as being much more delightful. Hobart is 
different from other cities in Australia in that much of the private development 
remains on a small to medium scale, often respecting the older buildings or adapting 
them to contemporary use. The main urban design problems have been caused by 
the Federal and State Governments and their instrumentalities. 
At present there are no coordinated plans for Sullivans Cove although the Battery 
Point Planning Scheme, the provisional City of Hobart Planning Scheme and various 
other studies focussing on the Cove cover the area. There are many government 
and private agencies wanting to control, and be involved with any redevelopment 
that may occur. The area is becoming popular for many reasons including its 
proximity to the city centre. 
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During the mid-1980s, in particular, a number of development proposals, having little 
or no regard for the preservation of the historical character of Sullivans Cove were 
implemented. These proposals included the Sheraton International Hotel, the Marine 
Board's control tower, the Centre for the Arts, the Executive offices in Murray Street, 
Mure's Fish Centre, the recycling of Gibson's City Mill, the redevelopment of the MTT 
Bus Depot, and the recycling of 60 per cent of the warehouses in Salamanca Place. 
Projects in the 'pipeline' included Hobart City Council's 'City Square' development 
and the Antarctic Museum proposal for Salamanca Place (The Mercury; 26/8/87). 
Some of these developments have been more controversial than others. The 
Sheraton International Hotel, a State (Liberal) Government initiated project, inspired 
enormous public outcry resulting in the mobilisation of different bodies claiming to 
represent the interests of Sullivans Cove. 
The Sheraton International Hotel debate encouraged the State Government to 
appoint the Sullivans Cove Development Association as its advisory body on 
Sullivans Cove. Its tasks were to raise awareness of the importance of Sullivans 
Cove to the city of Hobart, and encourage revitalisation of the area. It was jointly 
funded by the major landowners in Sullivans Cove: the Marine Board, the Hobart City 
Council and the State Government although its members were drawn from a range 
of agencies with interests in the Sullivans Cove area. Its advice would be based on 
consultants' studies such as the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study (SCUDS) 1983, 
the Sullivans Cove Landscaping and Streetscaping Works (Davey Street and  
International Hotel environs) 1986 and the Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and  
Bicentennial Walking Trail Study 1988.  
The Sullivans Cove Development Authority has the role of implementing planning 
policy but has no statutory power and its effectiveness depends entirely upon the 
cooperation and coordination of the various agencies involved. Some feel this 
Authority has less than ideal control over the opposing interests and future of 
Sullivans Cove as shown by the scale and and nature of development taking place 
there (The Mercury; 26/8/87). 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association was formed in 1986 through the initiative of 
members of the earlier Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee which had been formed 
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to express community opinions on the development of the international hotel. The 
Sullivans Cove Citizens Association expanded its concerns from the international 
hotel to the Civic Square project, the Antarctic Centre and limitations on building 
heights. Its membership is comprised of private members and nominees of affiliated 
organisations including the National Trust, the Art Society, the Archaeology Society, 
the Centre for the Arts, the Museums Association and professional fishermen. The 
Hobart City Council has given it the status of a 'neighbour' - to be informed without 
request of any development submission related to the Cove. It is currently concerned 
with a strategy plan by the Sullivans Cove Development Authority and the future role 
and structure of the Authority presently under government review. 
Another interested community organisation, Citizens for Hobart, arose from a public 
meeting - 'Hobart: A City in Crisis' - attended by 250 people in the Hobart Town Hall 
on 24 November, 1989. The meeting was called partly as a result of the outcry over 
the Hobart City Council's proposed Civic Square project. Citizens for Hobart was 
concerned at the directions in which new development was taking the city and 
wished to provide a vehicle for the 'real involvement of residents in planning the 
future of the city. It seeks the early, active and continuing involvement of residents in 
guiding the future of the city and the establishment of avenues for effective citizen 
participation, including comprehensive community discussion' (Citizens for Hobart 
Newsletter, Vol. 1, November, 1989). 
The types of groups who want to participate in planning matters have been 
discussed by Alterman, Harris and Hill (1982; p. 177). They found there were three 
main groups of participants, as listed below. Relating the Sullivans Cove 'actors' to 
these groups is helpful in understanding the context of the thesis. 
1. Major elites. 
These groups were organisations without whose cooperation or advice the local 
authority would find it difficult or even impossible to adopt and implement plans. The 
Hobart Marine Board and the Tasmanian State Government can be classified as 
major elites. The Sullivans Cove Development Authority, consisting of 
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representatives from the major elite groups and others, may also be classed as a 
major elite. 
2. Minor elites. 
These groups are composed of voluntary organisations active in the area. Many 
planning authorities approach such groups in order to obtain the different opinions 
held within the community. The Royal Australian Institute of Architects, the Sullivans 
Cove Citizens Association and the Citizens for Hobart group fit this classification. 
3. The Public. 
Individual members of the public may also be members of major or minor elites. 
Alterman, Harris and Hill (1984; p. 183) found that the planning authority was likely to 
view its relationship with the major elites as consultation, but similar status was not 
afforded voluntary bodies or members of the public at large. The Sullivans Cove 
experience appears to reflect these findings. 
1.2. Hypothesis and Method of the Thesis 
There are three linked hypotheses in this thesis. 
1. The public has had little input into decisionmaking in the planning of new 
development in Sullivans Cove, despite appearances and an apparent willingness by 
authorities to improve public participation opportunities in response to pressure. 
2. In line with Sandercock's (1978) arguments that the process may be more 
important than the product, authorities concerned with Sullivans Cove are ill-informed 
and unnecessarily defensive about real improvements in public participation, as 
people generally only want to be informed and have a 'ready opportunity to 
complain'. 
3. The reluctance of authorities to grant real improvements in public participation 
may be explained by a fear that to go a little further may increase the community's 
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understanding to the degree that a different kind of participation is actually 
demanded: beyond simply having a say in a decision here and there to a questioning 
of democratic processes in development decisionmaking, that is, to a situation where 
the wider community itself wants to set the goals for development, thereby widening 
democratic processes and seeking power sharing. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 outlines facets of the history of public participation 
in the United States, Great Britain and Australia. It also examines the theoretical 
development of public participation in order to understand the dilemmas of public 
participation. These include the lack of opportunities for 'real' participation and the 
perceived motivation of those who actually participate. 
The thesis aims to discuss public participation in relation to the outcome of decisions. 
Public participation in both the Sheraton International Hotel and the Civic Square 
case studies affected the outcomes. In the case of the Sheraton International Hotel, 
the public outcry resulted in the modification of the original design, a compromise. In 
the instance of the Civic Square, the outcry resulted in a negative result with the 
withdrawal of the proposal by the developer. In both cases public meetings and 
media attention appeared to be powerful forces. Institutionalised or formal public 
participation processes on their own appeared to achieve very little. 
The case studies of the Sheraton International Hotel and the Hobart Civic Square 
developments have been chosen as representative examples of two different types 
of decisionmaking in Sullivans Cove. A full analysis of the decisionmaking processes 
and the role and level of participation is given in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The 
Sheraton Hotel was a State Government initiative. It was originally to have had two 
eighteen storey reflective glass towers. The public protest against this scheme forced 
the government to compromise in the design. But the development was still 
exempted from normal planning processes by the State Government. (Plate 1, p. 15 




Plate 1 : The Sheraton International Hotel, Davey Street, Sullivans Cove. The 'compromise' development viewed from Constitution Dock. 
In contrast the Civic Square development showed an attempt by the Hobart City 
Council to avoid the public outcry associated with the Sheraton Hotel development. 
The Council encouraged public comment on the design and it was promoted as a 
showcase for public participation. 
Sullivans Cove represents a unique piece of Australian waterfront history and 
heritage. Redevelopment of Sullivans Cove is seen by both private and public 
agencies as an opportunity to encourage more intensive use of the waterfront 
especially as its shipping functions have suffered a degree of decline and some have 
been partially relocated. Conflicts are occurring over what developments are 
appropriate. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: The Effectiveness of Public 
Participation in Planning. 
Public participation in planning is akin to a game of snakes and 
ladders. Awaiting the unwary community on the rungs of Arnstein's 
Ladder of Participation are the ever larger snakes of professional 
pride, bureaucratic inertia, power corruption of sectional groups, and 
politicalideology, ready to push the community down to the lower 
levels or right back to Square One. For participation programmes to 
succeed, the snakes must be recognised, but there are questions 
beyond this. Where is the ladder climbing anyway? Has the ladder a 
stable basis? Perhaps an even more fundamental question is whether 
the ladder is leaning on the right wall. (Clark, 1986; p. 102) 
This literature review on public participation establishes a theoretical background for 
the two case studies. It accepts that public participation is a complex concept that 
has no common definition. Participants often have implicit, unrealistic and conflicting 
expectations and there are problems involved with distribution of material and power 
resources (Churchman, 1987; p. 290). 
Regardless of its intent or purpose, public participation, to a greater or lesser extent, 
is now part of planning legislation in the United States, Great Britain and Australia. It 
is the subject of debate among professionals, politicians and public alike. Both the 
planners and the public need to continually examine what is to be gained and 
expected from public participation. Further, it must be recognised as an issue that is 
political and ideological, not value-free (Thornley, 1977; p.54). 
The next section gives a 'thumbnail history' of public participation in the United 
States, Great Britain and Australia. More on the development of public participation 
theory follows as well as discussion of issues in theory and practice. 
2.1. Public Participation in Planning in the United States. 
Public participation in planning in the United States began in the 1950s but was 
transformed during the 1960s. It changed from informal consultation efforts by 
planners with recognised community leaders, to formal efforts at consulting the local 
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community. Prior to the 1960s little attempt was made by planners to involve the 
general public or even those particularly affected by a plan. True representation was 
lacking because the views and values of the selected community leaders and the 
planning profession were the same (Levine, 1963; p.195). 
Federally legislated programs developed during the 1950s and 1960s. These 
programs provided funds for Citizens Advisory Committees for urban renewal 
programs. By the mid-1960s people found that they were not being informed of the 
availability of these funds or how to access them. The slogan for this program was 
'maximum feasible participation for the poor'. It was interpreted by the local 
authorities as meaning that the poor should be employed by the program, and not 
be part of the decision making process (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; 
pp. 44-45). 
The demand for public participation by the public in the United States can be traced 
at least as far back as Saul Alinsky's book Reveille for Radicals written in 1946. The 
civil rights movement and the National Welfare Rights Organisation benefitted from 
his confrontationist tactics. Alinsky saw community organisation as complementary to 
representative democracy. His method was to bring in a paid organiser (his 
foundation provided such organisers) to help build an active local political 
community. The organiser would bring a community together by identifying•
campaigns that were achievable and teaching people how to go about winning the 
issue. Once the group was established the organiser would leave and it would 
become autonomous (Cochrane, 1986; pp. 53-54). 
A criticism of the Alinsky method was that specific campaigns were secondary. It was 
important to win to ensure the mobilisation of new organisational structures. There 
was also a constant search for new campaigns to win. The role of professional 
community organisers was not seen as consistent with democracy and the 
Alinsky-inspired community initiatives were not generally very successful in winning 
their main demands. Success depended on leadership qualities rather than on 
democratic involvement (Cochrane, 1986; pp. 54-55). 
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Urban renewal was also instrumental in the development of public participation in 
planning in the United States. It was the term used by local councils when large 
areas of inner city slum were cleared to enable the building of middle class 
residential units. The goal was to recolonise the inner city with 'the tax-paying, 
culture loving, free spending middle class' (Wilson, 1966; p. 247). 
Residents affected by urban renewal forced the decisionmakers to negotiate with 
them by using Alinsky-style tactics. The planners felt that these tactics exacerbated 
rather than prevented conflict, alienated the neighbourhood from the city as a whole 
rather than bringing it into the normal pattern of civic action, and placed a premium 
on power rather than a co-operative search for the common good. The attitude of the 
planning establishment towards public participation was that upper and upper-middle 
class people were more likely to think wholistically about long-term benefits and offer 
positive and constructive comments, whereas the lower and lower-middle classes 
were more likely to see planning in terms of specific threats and short-term costs 
(Wilson, 1966; pp.245-247). Burke (1979; p. 68-69), in reviewing the legacy of the 
urban renewal concept, however, noted that it was the first governmental programme 
to broaden the scope of participation beyond community elites. 
During the 1960s, Richard Nixon's 'War on Poverty' program consciously involved 
the poor in an attempt to help them help themselves. It institutionalised public 
participation. Community development, assisted housing, civil rights, public 
participation and environmental protection were now being seen as interdependent. 
The Federal Government responded to the increasing demands for participation by 
introducing relevant legislation (specifically the 1966 Demonstration Cities and 
Metropolitan Development Act and the 1974 Housing and Community Development 
(Oosthuizen, 1984; pp. 204-205). 
The 1960s saw the decline of the Alinsky confrontationist approach to public 
participation and the beginning of 'advocacy planning' in the form of legal 
intervention in the courts by those attempting reform. The early 1970s saw the rise of 
confrontation tactics again, over the Vietnam war and pollution of the environment. 
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Over time these tactics have developed into issue politics. It can be described as a 
referenda-like strategy in local government procedures. 
Issue politics is described as 'direct democracy'. There are many problems 
associated with this form of participation. They include the lack of equity or 
hierarchical mechanisms installed in the technique. The location of street lighting is 
given the same significance as the location of a nuclear power plant and there is no 
recognition that majority votes often discriminate against affected minorities. People 
cannot be expected to be informed on every issue put to them and are often 
influenced by campaigns instigated by big business interests (Victorian Council of 
Social Services, 1981; p. 45). 
2.2. Public Participation in Planning in Great Britain. 
Public participation in Great Britain in the 1980s experienced the same unsuccessful 
results as during the 1960s and 1970s. Only the methods of encouraging 
participation changed over time. The public believed the decisionmaking power was 
being usurped by non-elected officials because the elected members seemed unable 
to understand the problems presented to them. There appeared to be no effective 
public participation mechanisms available for the public (Victorian Council of Social 
Services, 1981; p. 46). 
The central government in Britain took a more structured approach to public 
participation than in the United States. It attempted to guide local authorities (through 
the 1964 Planning Advisory Group's Report, the 1968 Town and Country Planning 
Act, the 1968-9 Skeffington Committee Report, the London Airport Report, the 
Layfield Public Inquiry [Greater London Development Plan], the 1972 Town and 
Country Planning Act, and the 1975 Dobry Report [Review of the Development 
Control System] and others) in the processes of public participation (Victorian 
Council of Social Services, 1981; p. 46, Oosthuizen, 1984; p. 205). The aim was to 
make people aware of government, the services it offered, and how they could 
participate. However, making people aware of government processes also increased 
their demands for improvements in these processes and services. 
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The participation processes encouraged by central and local governments often 
ended in political militancy which went beyond the search for collective solutions to 
neighbourhood problems to ultimately challenging the councillor and officer 
hierarchy. When this occurred the authorities withdrew their support for the 
participation process and the participants would lose their contact with the local 
authority. Cochrane (1986; p. 60) found that once support was withdrawn, the 
community groups lost their power base and often became ineffectual. 
2.3. Public Participation in Planning in Australia. 
Public participation in planning in Australia over the past thirty years has been 
characterised by bureaucratic inertia, with the intentions of bureaucracy focussed on 
social and economic stability. Moves towards participatory democracy in Australia 
reacted against this inertia and sought to humanise the system (Payne, 1973; p. 26). 
Payne (1973; p.26-28) found the same problems in Australia as Wilson (1966; p. 
247) and others did in the United States and Britain. These included the phenomena 
of the poorer socio-economic groups tending to be motivated towards solving their 
immediate problems rather than contributing to broad social issues, and the 
existence of power groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and real estate 
institutes which were consistently able to influence policy making. Payne argued that 
planners and administrators needed to question how they assessed the public 
interest, as well as their strategies and reasons for encouraging participatory 
involvement. 
Hamilton-Smith (1975; pp.11-12) noted that increased and widespread participation 
could threaten the professionalism of planners by exposing mistakes, heightening 
conflicts, revealing previously unconsidered evidence, questioning the goals which 
had been established and demonstrating weaknesses in the strategies for their 
achievement. He also felt it was naive to expect people to have a significant impact 
on policies and plans to which the public authorities had devoted massive resources. 
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The Australian experiment with "Green Bans" in the mid-1970s showed how people 
could take control of some of the decisions affecting the shape of their cities 
(Fogg,1981; p. 264). Green Bans reflected some of the limitations of public 
participation experienced in the United States and Great Britain. For example, the 
movement was dependent on a charismatic leader and the prevailing economic 
climate. Public participation was achieved by dealing directly with the building union, 
the Builder's Labourers Federation (BLF) and the developers. The union would 
prevent work from starting on developments if it was convinced they were socially 
undesirable. Developers also began to consult with the union as to its opinion on 
proposed projects, although they were always refered back to the resident's group in 
the area affected and / or to the panel of architects advising the union. The BLF was 
led at this time by Jack Mundey, who encouraged both the resident's groups and the 
workers. 
Critics of the Green Ban movement claimed it only maintained the status quo. The 
rich kept their parks intact and prosperous suburbs kept their trees. Nevertheless, 
the poor did not have an expressway demolish their homes or have them replaced 
by office blocks. Others argued that the Green Ban movement supplied grass roots 
pressure for the subsequent planning legislation in New South Wales and persuaded 
planners to give more attention to the environmental and social side of their work. 
Green Bans are no longer a force in Australian planning. Perceptions of the 
economic situation are such that union members would think more than twice before 
withdrawing their labour. 
2.4. The Development of Participation Theory and Some Pitfalls in Practice. 
By the end of the 1960s Burke and Arnstein had developed theories and strategies 
. regarding the use and evaluation of the effectiveness of participation. Their work 
would be used as a base measurement for participation for the next two decades. 
Burke (1968; pp. 287-294) suggested that public participation should be interpreted 
and used as a planning tool. He identified five public participation strategies and 
described how planning agencies could use them in attaining specific goals. They 
were: education-therapy strategy; behavioural change strategy; staff supplement 
strategy; cooptation; and community power strategy. 
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Each strategy had its own advantages and disadvantages for the planning agency. 
The appropriateness of any strategy would depend on the capabilities and 
knowledge of the staff in implementation. Staff needed the skills to handle groups 
and individuals, analyse community systems, identify leaders and suggest individuals 
who could contribute knowledge and information. They had to understand the 
particular conditions necessary for the success of a particular strategy. This was 
often difficult and lead to confusion and conflict over the need for public participation 
in general. 
In response Arnstein developed her concept of the 'Ladder of Citizen Participation'. 
The 'Ladder' was a means for assessing public participation. Public participation was 
a term for citizen power. Without the redistribution of power, she felt participation was 
an empty and frustrating process (Arnstein, 1969; p. 216). She outlined eight levels 
of public participation. Each level corresponded with the extent of citizens' power in 
determining the end product: (1) Manipulation; (2) Therapy; (3) Informing; (4) 
Consultation; (5) Placation; (6) Partnership; (7) Delegated Power; and (8) Citizen 
Control (Arnstein, 1969; p. 217). 
Burke endorsed Arnstein's views on participation in 1979 when he published his own 
variation of the 'Ladder'. The public's roles in planning were placed in the following 
categories: review and comment; consultation; advisory; shared decisionmaking; and 
controlled decisionmaking. The specific roles were determined by a variety of factors 
including organisational objectives and need, legislation and regulations, public 
pressures and demands, and the issues of the moment (Burke, 1979; p.74). 
In 1979 Glass developed a theory of participation that included five general objectives 
to complement both the planning administration and the public's perspectives: 
information exchange, education, support building, decisionmaking supplement and 
representational input. The first three were associated with the administrative 
perspective, the last two reflected the public's perspective (Glass, 1979; p.182). He, 
like Burke, regarded no one single technique as universally applicable. Whatever 
technique was used depended on the situation and objectives sought. It was 
important to identify the objectives of participation and then select the technique. 
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Alterman (1982; p.297) criticised the type of strategies Glass and Burke developed 
because they were orientated to the planners and administrator's point of view. She 
suggested that a participatory program should take into account the objectives and 
actions of the participants as well as the planning agency. 
The 1980s saw the development of different categories of participation. Cochrane 
(1988; pp. 51-77) described them as the challenge from below, reform from above, 
and community politics as a control system. The third type, community politics as a 
control system, was a method with no ongoing participation implications. It was used 
as a once-only participation technique to curb state and local authority activity. It 
involved single-issue groups which disbanded when the issue was resolved. 
The challenge from below was associated with radical and extreme left political 
views and demands for ongoing participation and social reform. 
Reform from above was an attempt by local government authorities to control the 
process of participation. 
The aim is to involve people in decision making to commit them to 
decisions and to generate independent activity which is not 
threatening but supportive and - ultimately - subordinate rather 
than complementary (Cochrane 1986; p. 59). 
Public participation in the United Kingdom was very much involved with government 
reform measures. Hambleton (1988; p. 125) discussed three broad options for public 
service reform which were being tried by some local government authorities in Britain 
in the 1980s - consumerism Netting closer to the customer), decentralisation and 
the extension of local democracy. 
Consumerism was seen to be the way to ward off privatisation threats and respond 
to an increasingly vocal population regarding public service inadequacies. By the late 
1980s criticisms of the consumerist approach echoed criticisms of methods of public 
participation used since the 1960s. Although consumerism could provide direct 
consumer participation and powersharing it tended to lean toward customer relations 
with little serious change in participation but with much public visibility. The 
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established power relationship between those providing and those receiving services 
was not challenged (Hambleton, 1988; pp. 127-128). 
Decentralisation was an attempt to make authorities more accessible to the local 
communities. It was similar to other attempts by local authorities to encourage public 
participation. Objectives of decentralisation included improving services, local 
accountability, distribution of resources, public support and staff development. Most 
of the decentralisation initiatives of the 1980s did not bring about fundamental 
organisational change. Some initiatives were not even seen as vehicles for radical 
reform and would have been firmly resisted if it had been suggested (Hambleton, 
1988; pp. 133-135). 
The Islington and Tower Hamlets attempts at decentralisation were outstanding 
examples of how devolution of services, power and resources could be visualised 
and implemented. The new structures have not been in place long enough to 
critically analyse their success or failure over time but the concept and their progress 
are being monitored. The Tower Hamlets local government area was divided into 
seven neighbourhoods with the aim of making each of the seven communities more 
aware of local government services and enabling a consumerist approach (Morphett, 
1987; p. 124). 
Islington's decentralisation efforts involved opening 24 neighbourhood offices. The 
intent, like that of Tower Hamlets, was to improve accessibility to services and to 
devolve power to the local community to control the delivery of those services but the 
expectations of the public could not be met in the Islington experiment. It was soon 
found that decentralisation did not provide the answer to the fundamental 
inadequacy of resources to deal with inner London's escalating problems of poverty, 
deprivation and homelessness. The problems were a product of wider economic 
pressures (du Parcq, 1987; pp. 25-27, Cochrane, 1986; p. 55). 
The implementation of decentralisation did result in an improvement in services, but 
as Cochrane (1986; p. 75) pointed out: 
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For many of those dependent on local authority services, they 
continue to appear remarkedly undemocratic even in those places 
where 	 decentralisation has begun. The main measure of 
democracy for clients would be for their demands to be met 
quickly. Financial constraints in the past five years have made that 
less, not more, likely.... 
Islington and Tower Hamlets were bold experiments that could not be regarded as 
the norm in local government. The more widespread use of consumerism and 
decentralisation by local authorities offered managerial rather than political objectives 
in the form they were applied. They were an attempt to reform service provision 
rather than the organisations providing the service (Hambleton, 1988; p. 136). 
Extending local democracy was seen as a necessary component in improving the 
poor image of local government. Public understanding and involvement in local 
government matters was low, and other government authorities continued to 
undermine the role and scope of local government (Hambleton, 1988; p. 139). 
There were many ways of strengthening local democracy and all started with the view 
that political change was necessary. Local politics had become much more sectional, 
reflecting a general trend towards a more assertive society. These sectional 
pressures were pushing local representative democracy to expand towards more 
participatory forms (Hambleton, 1988; p. 138). Processes based only upon 
representation are limited in the goals they can achieve (Churchman, 1987; p. 295). 
Churchman (1987; p. 294) found that residents who participated in local government 
participation processes could achieve some goals. Direct participation provided 
personal benefits for the residents. Residents gained a degree of authority and were 
able to express their needs and preferences, learned about planning and how to use 
the system, became more active in the community, attained leadership positions and 
recognition, improved their self confidence and self image, supported the project in 
question and achieved a certain amount of non-radical, political change. Local 
government was also able to achieve greater support from the participating 
residents. Decision making was affected by the involvement of residents, but limits 
26 
were often placed on the type of decisions open to residents, and in turn, the 
residents' faith was placed in the professional opinions offered to them. The result 
was that plans were not significantly or in essence different from the plans that would 
have resulted had the residents not participated. There were differences in emphasis 
but not in basic structure. Satisfaction with the environment was higher in the groups 
where there was at least some form of participation and this suggested that 
satisfaction was not a direct function of the quality of the environment, but was also 
related to feelings of competence and control. 
Long and Alterman, Harris and Hill highlighted some common attitudes of 
government authorities during the 1970s and 1980s and the efforts made by them to 
minimalise public participation. Long (1975; pp.91-97) found that the invitation for the 
public to participate in planning matters was usually badly managed. The type of 
participation offered and the expertise of the participants were factors in the 
effectiveness of the public participation process. Only a relatively small proportion of 
comments had any effect and some groups and types of comments had a greater 
effect. The late timing of most participation disallowed radical changes but early 
participation did not guarantee change either (Alterman, Harris and Hill, 1984; p.177, 
181). 
The authors attributed the lack of effectiveness of the participants' comments to 
several causes including: the late stage in the planning process; the participants 
were responding to a completed draft plan presenting a single and detailed 
alternative; the planners preconceptions may have been difficult to change; or, it may 
have been the lack of public expertise. 
2.5. Deficiencies in Theory and Practice 
Sandercock's description of the deficiencies in the theory and practice of public 
participation is now regarded as one of the most coherent comments on the subject 
(Fogg, 1981; p.259). Her comments about public participation have set the tone for 
nearly all subsequent professional attitudes towards participation in planning, 
particularly in Australia: 
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...Participation is not a substitute for planning or regular 
government: it often leads to non-planning and semi-anarchic 
government. It is not an effective means of radical social change: 
it often has the opposite effect. And it is not an effective way of 
involving the 'have-nots' in decisionmaking: all the procedures of 
participation so far tried are biased towards involving the middle 
class. 
But there are other ends participation may serve. 
In some circumstances the process may be more important than 
the product. People want to be informed. They want to know that 
they have a ready opportunity to complain. An open planning 
process, providing easy access to both information and to the 
planners, can reassure people that they are being thought of. 
Participatory mechanisms, even those involving no devolution of 
power, may make public authorities more honest and humane and 
considerate of the people they are serving than they would 
otherwise be: more thoughtful of broader issues than their single 
purpose functions, more sensitive in performing their duties. And 
participation at the local level may elicit informed and useful 
responses on questions of local detail, on things that may not 
seem important to planners (who are therefore unlikely to think of 
them) but are usually very important in the lives of those 
suggesting them. So this level of participation may produce a 
better result for residents, without threatening what planners 
regard as their expertise, and without bogging down the planning 
process irretrievably. (Sandercock, 1978; p.7) 
Fogg's (1981; p. 259) account of Sandercock's main points are echoed throughout 
most of the planning literature reviewed: there is no widespread consensus as to the 
meaning and purpose of participation; the most ambitious theories and models of 
participation have proved disappointing; the participatory procedures have satisfied 
neither government nor people; and public participation is possible only by sacrificing 
other governmental principles such as equality of opportunity (eg. a neighbourhood 
may decide to use its power to exclude blacks or jews or public housing or homes for 
the mentally ill or whites [Sandercock, 1978; p. 13]). 
Susskind and Elliott (1984; pp. 181-182) discovered some problems action groups 
have when involving themselves in formal, often legislated and therefore 
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institutionalised, participation procedures. The procedures were expensive in time 
and money and groups that decided to participate often found themselves short of 
the resources they needed to act independently. Participation required compromise 
and groups would often splinter over the extent to which compromise was 
appropriate. They often had to moderate their claims or style of attack with the result 
of reduced media coverage and less ability to apply pressure. 
If action groups lost their autonomy, they also lost their ability to threaten resumption 
of conflict. They also found that their membership had disbanded and that they could 
not regain their former members. These phenomena were identified in the United 
States in 1968 by Burke. Little seems to have changed over time or place. 
Involvement in formalised procedures appears to have more disadvantages than 
advantages for an action group. Use of conflict tactics, although adversarial, can be 
effective in achieving and maintaining grassroots support and media attention. It also 
prevents officialdom from manipulating or coopting the group. But effective ongoing 
participation processes are difficult to sustain. 
Cochrane (1986; p. 73) described the dilemma of grassroots mobilisation. 
Mobilisation was difficult to sustain over time. When an issue became widely 
supported, it tended to be absorbed by the main political parties and specific radical 
demands were diluted. The other side of the dilemma was that community initiatives 
were only able to sustain themselves if they committed themselves to the main 
political parties. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The theory of public participation over the last thirty years has concentrated on 
power and democratic structures rather than on outcomes. du Parcq outlined three 
problems with power structures: 
There are three main constraints to effective delegation and 
devolution of power - the unwillingness of those who have the power 
to part with any of it, the less enthusiastic response from the 
neighbourhood / community to the particular brand of democratisation 
on offer and the inertia of the local government system, particularly 
in a time of dwindling resources (du Parcq, 1987; p. 26) 
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The common threads that run through the participation literature over the past 30 
years tend to reflect these phenomena: 
(i) Institutionalised participation has enabled participants to achieve personal benefits 
(eg. leadership qualities, self-esteem) but at the expense of public participation 
becoming a sanctioning element in the decision making process rather than effecting 
any changes to an outcome. 
(ii)The lack of resources to facilitate public participation resulted in exploitation of the 
participant's abilities, expertise and time. 
(iii)Governing bodies have generally been successful in their stance that participants 
can be controlled or managed by the threat of withdrawal of support if they became 
militant. 
In the late 1980s sectional pressures have demanded more participatory forms of 
democracy. The idea that a majority decision was more democratic than one 
allowing those minorities most affected to have a greater say was no longer an 
accepted assumption. But the history of public participation shows that pressure has 
to be applied before authorities will make any changes to their attitudes about public 
participation. 
Many of the articles revealed attitudes by planners that were negative, manipulative, 
and defensive about the role and effectiveness of public participation, even though 
participation is accepted as part of the ethical and ideological base of the planning 
profession (Alterman, 1982; p. 311). It seems the .focus is on techniques of 
neutralising or minimalising the effectiveness of any public participation that may be 
forced upon them. This attitude is presented in relation to the Sullivans Cove case 
studies in the first hypothesis: the public has had little input in the planning of new 
development in Sullivans Cove, despite appearances and an apparent willingness by 
authorities to improve public participation opportunities in response to pressure. 
Churchman examined the importance of the process rather than the outcome for the 
participants. In spite of the planning professions attitudes toward public participation 
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she found that when there were limits put on the type of decisions open to 
participation and when professional opinions were made available to the participants, 
the public participation process would give results that broadly supported the local 
authority or institution. 
Thus, if public participation were an accepted part of most decision making 
processes, it would appear not to make a significant difference to the final outcome 
as deference to professional opinions is given by participants and planners alike. 
Sandercock canvassed an open planning process to reassure the public that its 
needs were being taken into consideration. From this stance the second hypothesis 
can be developed: authorities concerned with Sullivans Cove are ill-informed and 
unnecessarily defensive about real improvements in public participation. People only 
want to be informed and have a 'ready opportunity to complain'. 
The authorities seem to be afraid of losing control of the decision making process, 
even though it has been shown that the actual outcome of the process is not 
significantly changed by institutionalised participation and the threat of withdrawal of 
support is a powerful control mechanism. Possible explanations for the authorities 
defensiveness could be the threat of powersharing or actual ignorance of public 
participation processes. It would appear that an institution will still opt for limiting 
public participation rather than risk losing its overriding decision making power or 
disclosing its ignorance of procedures. 
Almost all the literature written from the authorities' perspective recommends that 
participation should be controlled and suggests techniques to facilitate this 
manipulation. The use of conflict tactics, advocacy planning and issue politics is a 
reaction against the lack of institutionalised support and interest in public 
participation and opinion. The mere existence of an administrative perspective 
opposed to the public perspective assumes that sides are taken for or against 
particular methods of participation. 
The third hypothesis is derived from these findings: the reluctance of authorities to 
allow more effective public participation may be explained by a fear that to go a little 
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further may increase the community's understanding to the degree that a different 
kind of participation is actually demanded - beyond simply having a say in a decision 
here and there to an actual questioning of democratic and powersharing processes 
involved in development decisionmaking. 
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Chapter 3: Case Study 1 - The Sheraton International Hotel. 
3.1. Introduction 
The idea of an international hotel for Hobart emerged as an important and 
controversial development concept for the city in the early 1980s. The Pacific 
Enterprise Corporation had been given planning approval by the Hobart City Council 
to develop an international hotel in Kirksway Place, Battery Point. It was expected 
that the Hilton Hotel Group would manage it (The Mercury; 11/3/81). 
The proposal was opposed in the State Planning Appeals Board by the Battery Point 
Progress Association, the' National Trust and the Marieville Residents Association. 
The appeal was on the grounds that the decision and development were contrary to 
the principles, intent and goals of the Battery Point Planning Scheme (The Mercury; 
11/3/81). The appellants argued that the hotel would introduce a completely new 
scale and bulk to Battery Point (The Mercury; 11/3/81); that there was already ample 
accomodation in Battery Point; and that parking and traffic generation were important 
unaddressed issues. The addition of another complex would seriously affect the 
residential integrity of Battery Point. The Marieville Residents Association accused 
the Hobart City Council of not providing enough information, thereby denying citizens 
the right to make an informed representation as allowed by the Battery Point 
Planning Scheme (The Mercury; 12/3/81). 
The hotel development was finally thwarted by a technicality, a 'right-of-way' on the 
land title which dated back to 1847. Its existence was upheld by the Supreme Court. 
The 'right-of-way' split the site making development of the type planned difficult (The 
Mercury; 24/12/81). 
In December 1982 the Hobart City Council announced that it had re-entered 
negotiations with an undisclosed company to develop an international standard hotel 
in Gladstone Street, Battery Point (The Mercury; 21/12/82). But early in 1983, the 
Tasmanian Liberal Premier, Mr. Robin Gray, decided to take the concept out of the 
Council's hands, and began preparations for an international hotel on the site of his 
choosing alongside the docks in Sullivans Cove. (Refer to Map 1, p. 34 which 









Map 1: The Sheraton International Hotel site, Davey Street, Sullivans Cove. 
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3.1.1: The Tasmanian Government's Initial Moves. 
The State (Liberal) Government claimed it had identified the need for an international 
hotel in Hobart soon after it came to office. The Premier outlined the perceived 
benefits to Parliament on March 21, 1985. A new international hotel for Hobart 
would take advantage of the upgrading of Hobart airport to international standard; be 
the equivalent of a new industry in the city in creating employment; return 
employment to the building industry after the reduction of Commonwealth activity; 
and help maintain Tasmanian standards of living and revitalise the economy. 
In June 1983 the State Government advertised both nationally and overseas for 
expressions of interest. The Premier announced the Government would consider 
providing financial assistance but offered no details to the public. The Government 
received 26 responses to the advertisements. The four firms invited by the 
Government to submit proposals on the international hotel were Civic and Civic, 
Jennings Industries, White Industries, and GHD Planner West (The Mercury; 
14/11/84). 
None of the proposals satisfied the height limitations recommended by the 1983 
Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study or the 1982 draft Hobart City Planning Scheme. 
The guidelines provided by the Government in the Brief to the final four contenders 
emphasised that the hotel must be a landmark and did not refer to these two 
planning guidelines. The State Government was to have a financial involvement of 
$10 million in the development and would lease the site to the developers for a 
peppercorn rental. This would allow treatment as a Government development to 
which the 'Crown prerogative' would apply, exempting it from the normal planning 
requirements of Hobart City Council. The Local Government Act does not apply to 
Government developments, but the State and Commonwealth Governments usually 
take into account the view of Councils and the public. 
The Premier appointed an internal subcommittee to advise the best proposal. No 
design advisor was on this subcommittee which recommended the Jennings 
Industries proposal (The Examiner; 22/11/84) . The State Government subsequently 
chose the GHD Planner West proposal. 
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In November 1984 the GHD Planner West plans were made available and public 
debate raged over the design which consisted of twin 18 story towers of reflective 
glass. Legislation ratifying the Government's stake of $10 million in the hotel was 
expected to be introduced and passed before Christmas, allowing a construction 
start in March 1985. Criticism of the hotel included its design, its scale, contrasting 
sharply with the average height of 3-4 floors of Sullivans Cove's 19th century 
buildings, and the lack of consultation with the community and interested groups 
(The Examiner; 22/11/84). The Tasmanian chapters of the Royal Australian Institute 
of Architects (RAIA) and the Royal Australian Planning Institute (RAPI) rejected the 
design, whilst Hobart's Lord Mayor supported the expected State Government move 
to legislate for the development (The Mercury; 13/11/84). 
3.1.2. The Public Response. 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee (SCCC) was formed as a result of the 
spontaneous public debate which erupted. The Tasmanian chapters of the RAIA and 
RAPI initiated its formation when they called a public meeting regarding the 
proposed hotel on November 21, 1984. A crowd of 600 called on the Government to 
reject the GHD Planner West design. A further public meeting was held on 
November 28, 1984 when a steering committee (called the Sullivans Cove Citizens 
Committee) was appointed. 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee found there appeared to be widespread 
support for the concept of an international hotel, that there appeared to be no 
significant questioning of the appropriateness of the Davey Street / Victoria Dock 
site, and no objections to the removal of the existing buildings (Draft Submission to 
the Premier; November, 1984; p. 2). 
It asked whether the Government had prepared studies to establish that a new hotel 
was justified; what its effects would be on the existing hospitality industry and about 
its viability and the Government's proposal to invest State funds in the project. It 
criticised the Government for disregarding normal procedures for the approval of 
building projects and its apparent disregard of restrictions recommended by both the 
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1982 draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme and the 1983 SuDivans Cove Urban  
Design Study (SCCC Position Statement; p.1). 
It protested against (i) the excessive height of the proposed hotel, which was more 
than twice the maximum suggested in the Sullivans Cove Study and would make the 
Wel higher than any other city building; (ii) the siting of the planned towers close to 
the dock which was the reverse of recommendations made by the Sullivans Cove  
Study; (iii) the reflective external walls which were seen to be tawdry, 'gimmicky' and 
alien to the Cove; and (iv) the overwhelming bulk of the towers which would 
decrease the public's enjoyment and appreciation of the historic dock area as a 
recreation space and tourist attraction. It was argued that there were other ways of 
creating visual impact besides sheer height; that local expertise should be used as 
well as local building materials; and that the proposed remission of rates, payable to 
the Hobart City Council, discriminated against Hobart ratepayers (SCCC Position 
Statement; pp. 2-3). The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee decided, because of the 
divergent opinions within the group, and as it was not in a position to comment on 
the effects of the proposed hotel on existing establishments, that the economics of 
the new hotel could not be addressed within its own structure. 
Although the Premier and the architects decided to redesign the proposed hotel and 
the Sullivans Cove Development Authority was given a role in negotiating the new 
design, the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee remained concerned about: 
i).the effectiveness of the proposed redesign, as the architect's 
representative, Mr. Beam, had made it very clear that he saw the 
height and tower blocks as essential to the effective use of the site 
and to the commercial viability of the hotel; and 
ii) the ability of the Su!livens Cove Development Authority to act as 
an effective channel for consultation, as it had not been set up for 
that purpose and, with the exception of its chairman, Mr. Claudio 
Alcorso, was made up of office! representatives - of the Government, 
the City Council, the Marine Board, the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Institutes of Architects and Planning (SCCC Bulletin 1; 13/12/84). 
The Committee felt the Authority should have citizen representation, 
with the Sullivens Cove Citizens Committee providing such 
representation (SCCC Position Statement; p. 3). 
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The Premier's response was to inform the Committee that the Hobart' City Council 
would be responsible for examining and recommending the new hotel design and 
that the State Government would not receive opinions except those provided by the 
Hobart City Council. He added that a) an international hotel was going ahead on the 
Sullivans Cove site, the only question was design; b) another high-rise was not likely 
to be submitted; c) a satisfactory design would be accepted during March; and d) 
studies had been done by the developers to ensure that they could make money out 
of the hotel, and the issue of the effect on other Hobart accommodation and hotel 
trade was one best left to the market to sort out (SCCC Bulletin 2; February, 1985 
and SCCC Submission to the Hobart City Council; 11/4/85). 
The Site Development Brief for the redesign of the proposed hotel, prepared for the 
Hobart City Council was made available to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee at 
the end of January, 1985. The Brief had been endorsed by the Council without broad 
public comment or input, although the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee had been 
consulted during its preparation. The latter found the guidelines inadequate and 
requested the requirement of a full public statement from the architects explaining 
the features of the intended design and their relation to the guidelines. It also insisted 
that Council follow procedures which would allow for public information and response 
once the new plans were available (Letter to Town Clerk; 9/2/85). 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee responded to the Hobart City Council's 
public notice in The Mercury, 30/3/85, Hobart's daily newspaper, inviting public 
submissions on the redesign of the proposed international hotel, with a seven page 
critique. It listed the matters of concern which included: i) the design not conforming 
to the City of Hobart Planning Scheme; ii) the guidelines being inappropriate; iii) the 
availability of possible alternatives; iv) the use of the site; v) the scale of the 
development - especially its bulk and height; vi) its effects on vistas and views; vii) 
the building materials and their colour; and viii) doubts that the hotel was of a 5-star 
standard. It emphasised that because the second design was preferred to the first, it 
did not make it suitable; and that threats by Government and developers about 
discouraging development should be irrelevant to sound planning decisions. 
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The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee challenged the Premier's enthusiasm about 
employment creation potential, commenting on the warning made by the executive 
director of the Master Builders Association (The Mercury, 16/3/85) that there was a 
likely lack of available labour if several imminent large projects were to go ahead. 
The Director of Planning and Development had also commented that Hobart's labour 
and building materials resources would be stretched for the next few years (Ihe 
Mercury; 16/3/85). 
In April 1985, the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee released the results of a survey 
they had conducted with Hobart residents. The results were as follows: 
Total response 1050 people 
Not in favour of latest proposal 75% 
In favour of latest proposal 25% 
No more tourist accommodation is needed 25% 
Will damage existing local business 23% 
Taxpayers' money should be used 11% 
(Letter to the Town Clerk; 24/4/85) 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee analysis of these results claimed that: i) the 
main reason for rejection of the proposal was the design's lack of suitability for the 
site; ii) there was still widespread interest in the hotel issue; and iii) people were not 
opposed to the development of the site or of the provision of more tourist facilities. It 
called on the Council to resist the unnecessary pressure for haste which the State 
Government would apply (Letter to the Town Clerk; 24/4/85). 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was an insistent and eloquent voice in the 
debate over the design of the proposed international hotel. Its representations to the 
Premier and the Hobart City Council were articulate and informed and there can be 
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no doubt that its involvement facilitated the redesign of the hotel. It was a very 
forthright and effective lobbying organisation even though its extensive list of 
questions and concerns were rarely formally or publicly answered by either the State 
Government or the Hobart City Council. 
Nevertheless, it can be criticised in its role as public watchdog and informer. In 
March 1985 it was a participant in a secret meeting to discuss the new plans for the 
international hotel. The State Government had insisted on complete confidentiality by 
all involved in these discussions. The Sullivans Cove Development Authority, the 
National Trust, local architects, as well as the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee 
agreed to the conditions (The.1,1e/Qua; 14/3/85). It might be argued that the 
opportunity for participation and consultation justified following the secrecy rules. The 
role of the SCCC as a public pressure group may have been compromised by 
complicity, despite the announcement afterwards that it opposed the new design. 
3.1.3. The Hobart City Council. 
The Hobart City Council had been aware of the controversy surrounding the 
proposed hotel. It was aware that it needed to clarify its own position while the State 
Government was treating the international hotel as a Government development with 
'Crown perogative'. After the second public meeting on November 28, 1984 (when 
the S.ullivans Cove Citizens Committee was formed, a redesign of the proposed hotel 
mooted, and the Council was subsequently given the responsibility for examining the 
proposal) the Lord Mayor, Alderman Brian Broadby, wrote to the Premier outlining 
the Council's conditions for accepting the responsibility of the public participation. 
The Lord Mayor advised the Government 
that although it was considered within the Council's right to deal 
with the development outside the normal planning provisions as a 
government development, nevertheless, it wished to be protected 
in legislation against claims that it should have considered the 
matter under the normal planning processes which are subject to 
appeal (Letter from the Lord Mayor to the Premier, November 30, 
1984). 
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On December 12, 1984 the State Government accepted Council's conditions 
confirming that both the State Government and the Lord Mayor wanted legislation to 
fast-track the development. The Premier gave the responsibility for examining and 
recommending a new hotel design to the Hobart City Council because it had the 
mechanisms for providing public input. 
3.1.4. The Site Development Brief for the International Hotel. 
The Site Development Brief for the International Hotel required by the Hobart City 
Council was prepared by Lester Firth and Associates for $10,000. It was received in 
mid-January 1985. The full Council adopted the final guidelines. Although they had 
been prepared after consultation with various interest groups and professional 
bodies, including the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee, they had not been released 
to the public for comment. The resultant Brief deviated little from the Sullivans Cove 
Urban Design Study which Lester Firth and Associates had prepared for the 
Sullivans Cove Development Authority in 1983. 
3.1.5. The 1983 Su!livens Cove Urban Design Study. 
The 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study mentioned that the State Government 
was working toward the development of an international hotel on this site (SCUDS, 
1983; p. 148) and confined itself to commenting on design concepts rather than 
alternative development suggestions. It suggested: 
....(A)ppropriate uses would include partial, or full, site development 
for tourist/hoteVconvention facilities, related cultural uses and/or 
office accommodation together with on site parking provision. 
(SCUDS, 1983; p. 126) 
A major arrival space should be located at the head of Hunter Street 
and the development form related to the historic docks area. A two or 
three podium base related to the height of Customs House with a six 
to eight storey tower, setback from the podium edge, could readily be 
accepted within the urban design framework. (SCUDS, 1983; p.128) 
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3.1.6. The 1982 City of Hobart Planning Scheme. 
The 1982 draft City of Hobart Planning Scheme was also discussed in the 1985 Site  
Development Brief. The Brief noted that the Planning Scheme supported land use 
directed towards tourism and related activities in the Frame Precinct 13 (where the 
international hotel was to be located) but stressed the maintenance of the 2-3 storey 
historic 'wall' around the Cove and the geometric building forms. It recommended a 
maximum height of four storeys for buildings built to the street frontage. 
Confusingly, the Planning Scheme also suggested that the maximum height of new 
buildings should not be greater than the prevailing height of buildings in the vicinity 
unless it could be satisfactorily demonstrated that the proposed development would 
not have a detrimental effect on the existing townscape amenity and environment. It 
also suggested that within the frame district, new buildings would not be permitted to 
exceed 12 metres in height unless the Council was satisfied that there were unusual 
topographic or other circumstances. The Planning Scheme provided for the 
international hotel site to have a plot ratio of between 0.5 and 2.0. It also permitted 
bonus plot ratios to be awarded in respect of developments which provided specific 
uses, facilities and features required for the benefit of the city (Lester Firth, 1985; p. 4 
and HCC Planning Scheme, 1982). 
The Site Development Brief justified its suggested design guidelines by relating it to 
the Planning Scheme: 
i) A two or three storey podium base would relate to the height of the 
nearby 3-storey Customs House and the upper built form of around 6 to 
8 storeys which would relate to the gasworks tower. It thus 
seemingly satisfied the requirements of maintaining the historic wall 
around the Cove and not being greater than the prevailing height of 
buildings in the vicinity. (Refer to Plate 2 for an illustration of the effect of 
Sheraton International Hotel's Podium base and the Customs House.) 
ii)The stepped building form was a design measure to reduce the 
building's height and bulk. 
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Plate 2 : The Sheraton International Hotel (right) and the Customs House (left). The podium of the Hotel was to 
relate to the height of the Customs House. 
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iii) The setback of the podium from the street frontage reflected the 
setback of the Town Hall, Museum and the Ordinance building (Lester 
Firth, 1985; pp. 8-10). 
The Brief suggested that any subsequent extensions to the museum should reflect 
the setback of the proposed international hotel to achieve visual continuity. 
3.1.7. The Redesign of the Proposed International Hotel. 
The redesign of the proposed international hotel occured during January and 
February 1985 after the adoption of the Site Development Brief. During January and 
February 1985 the architects revisited Hobart several times to consult with various 
interest groups. They had extensive discussions with Mr. Alf Lester to ensure any 
new design met his guidelines. By mid-February 1985 the new design had reached a 
preliminary stage and the architects met with the Sullivans Cove Development 
Authority, the Hobart City Council, the National Trust, town planners, professional 
architects and other interested Hobart groups such as the Sullivans Cove Citizens 
Committee to get agreement before the formal submisssion of the plans to the 
Council. The suggested amendments took several weeks to complete. 
Council advertised the revised plans on March 30, 1985 to seek objections (which 
were to be treated as opinions only) and the plans and details were made available 
for public inspection at the Town Hall for two weeks from April 2 - 15, 1985. The 
opinions of the public and those of Council were then to be passed on to the 
Government for consideration. It appeared the State Government wanted to prevent 
a repeat of the public outcry sparked by the apparent fait accompli of the initial 
design of the hotel. The hotel was becoming an election liability rather than an asset 
(The Mercury; 28/2/85). 
At the subsequent Hobart City Council meeting of April 22, 1985 the Council decided 
the revised plans conformed with the Site Development Brief and the Council offered 
no objection to the proposal subject to some conditions (Minutes of Council Meeting; 
22/4/85). The State (Liberal) Government had already introduced the fast-track 
legislation by this time. 
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3.1.8. The Financial Package Provided by the State Government. 
The financial package provided by the State Government to the developers was also 
being redesigned. It was now limited to interest bearing loans that Premier Gray said 
were very similar to normal development loans. The Government had originally 
planned to provide $10m of the $50m capital cost of the hotel development, giving it 
a 20% interest (The Advocate, 2213/85). The final financial package was as follows: 
(i) $6.75m at 8% interest repayable at the end of 10 years when 
construction was completed. 
(ii) Project participants agreed to purchase the land from the 
Government for $3.1m. $3m would then be loaned back to the project 
participants at 8% interest repayable at the end of 10 years. 
(iii) The Government would also waive stamp duty charges on the 
purchase of the land. 
Premier Gray emphasised that the project must commence before June 30, 1985 or 
it would lose the Federal Government's 18% investment allowance. He felt there had 
been sufficient public input into the revised hotel design and that the project should 
be given the go-ahead as soon as possible (The Advocate; 22/3/85). 
3.1.9. The International Hotel Development Bill 1985 
The International Hotel Development Bill 1985 was read for the second time on April 
10, 1985. The Premier explained that the Government, the Hobart City Council, 
various interest groups and the public had engaged in a most exhaustive 
consultation process about the development and due to time constraints the 
Government did not view the normal planning and building approval processes as 
appropriate. The Bill was necessary to protect the Hobart City Council and to ensure 
construction proceeded without delay. The emphasis justifying the fast-track 
legislation had changed from the hotel being a Government development with public 
equity to the argument that the public had had adequate input and the development 
needed facilitating to ensure an early start. 
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3.1.10. The Developer's Response 
The developer's response to the delays in approving the international hotel was: 
The dilemma that exists is that the State Government must maximise 
the development of its narrow economic base and yet Tasmanians in 
general, and Hobartians in particular, are represented as wishing to 
unconditionally maintain the status quo (Tasmania) depends on 
interstate business and (yet) it is suggested we design ... exclusively 
for Hobartians. 
The approved design lacked the 'landmark' quality of the original 18- 
storey proposal but was an acceptable compromise between the 
operational needs of an international hotel and the sometimes conflicting 
but always provincial expressions of concern. (The Mercury; 15/11/85) 
Mr. Rippon, a GHD Planner West representative, called on the Government to 
ensure that general development and design rules were specified in advance and not 
midstream of the development. 
3.2. Summary of the Sheraton International Hotel Case Study 
The State (Liberal) Government decided it would promote and encourage the 
building of an international hotel after the failure of two such attempts by the Hobart 
City Council. After advertising for interested developers, the Government eventually 
shortlisted four designs which met its requirement for a 'landmark' development. The 
successful design chosen by the Government was the most dramatic and expensive. 
When this design was presented to the public there was enormous uproar and a 
public protest campaign mounted. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was 
formed as a result of a public meeting attended by 600 people. The design of the 
Hotel was regarded as unsympathetic to the historic precinct and docklands area in 
which it was to be located. The public appeared to have no argument with the 
concept of an international hotel or the site chosen. The design chosen by the 
Government and the lack of public participation were the major problems. 
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The Premier agreed to the redesign of the hotel after the public protest meeting and 
handed the responsibility for examining and recommending a new design to the 
Hobart City Council. The Hobart City Council prepared guidelines for the new design 
and the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee was consulted. The Sullivans Cove 
Citizens Committee found the guidelines to be inadequate. Nevertheless, these 
guidelines were given to the GHD Planner West architects. 
The redesigned International Hotel was offered for public comment in March 1985 by 
the Hobart City Council. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee, among others, 
submitted a lengthy response. At the subsequent April 22 Council meeting the 
Council accepted the redesign. 
The Council accepted the redesign knowing that the development had already been 
fast-tracked by the State Government. The Government had introduced fast-track 
legislation earlier in April using the argument that there had been exhaustive public 
comment, therefore normal planning and building approval processes were 
unnecessary. 
The developers had been told by the State Government to provide a landmark 
building and this is what they did in the first instance. They also redesigned it on 
request and followed the Hobart City Council's development guidelines closely. The 
Government had not initially considered allowing public comment on the' design of 
the Hotel. It had been correct in its assumption that the concept of an international 
hotel would be accepted by the public and that the Davey Street / Victoria Docks site 
would be regarded as appropriate. It was a logical progression for the Government to 
believe that the design it chose would also be accepted by the public. An 
international hotel is of necessity a large building. If a large building was necessary 
then it might as well be a 'landmark'. 
The Government's miscalculation of the public's reaction was in not recognising 
Sullivans Cove heritage values and the importance the community placed on those 
values. A modern 'landmark' building of 18 storeys set back from the street was to be 
put in a historic area where the buildings were predominately 3-4 storeys high, 
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forming a 'wall' around the Cove. The design of the Hotel was totally unsympathetic 
to Sullivans Cove. (Refer to Plate 3 which illustrates an example of the 'wall' around 
the cove) 
The people of Hobart wanted the right to have a say on the development. The 
Government should have realised that there would be public controversy over the 
hotel and allowed for its participation. The Hobart City Council had tried twice to 
encourage the development of such a Hotel and failed both times, once having had 
to deal with a public legal challenge. 
3.3. Analysis of Participation. 
There was little appearance of public participation in the International Hotel 
development even though considerable public pressure was applied to achieve the 
participation eventually permitted. The conceded participation consisted of the 
Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee being consulted during the preparation of the 
Site Development Brief  and being present at a confidential meeting to discuss the 
new plans, and the public having two weeks to comment on the redesigned 
development. 
Consultation did not mean having input. The Site Development Brief was adopted by 
Hobart City Council without the approval of the bodies it had consulted. The public 
was invited to comment on the government sanctioned redesign but fast-track 
legislation was introduced before this process was complete. Although the legislation 
did not detail the design specifications the State Government's attitude did not give 
the public any Confidence that its opinion was to be considered. 
Public participation had not been intended to be a factor in the decisionmaking for 
the development of the Sheraton International Hotel. The participation eventually 
allowed gave no opportunity for a complete rethink about the development's 
relevance to the historic precinct in which it was located. The public had no 
opportunity to say what it actually wanted or how it wanted the precinct developed. 
The State Government's justification for fast-tracking the development was that there 
had been exhaustive public comment. The Government was confusing media 
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Plate 3: The Hunter Street 'Wall' of buildings. The Sheraton International is located at the northern end of Hunter Street (North - ,,t ) 
attention and criticism with formal input of which there was none heeded. Formal 
public participation did not change the design of the development. Media pressure 
and the size of the public protest meeting were the impetus for the Government to 
compromise the design. 
The State Government could not take advantage of public participation as a planning 
tool in the original design. When the people of Hobart insisted on the right to 
comment it became obvious that the the State Government could not comply as it did 
not have the required public participation mechanisms. It had to ask the Hobart City 
Council to provide the appropriate mechanisms. 
Following the public meeting called to protest the design, the State Government 
agreed to redesign the proposal and allow public participation through the Hobart 
City Council but it was at Arnstein's consultation level. The public was invited to 
'participate in participation' (Arnstein, 1969; p. 219). The participation also 'conformed 
to Burke's lowest level of review and comment (Burke, 1979; p. 74). The public was 
given an opportunity to review the redesigned plans but no commitment was given to 
alter or modify those plans. 
The participation did not qualify for Glass' lowest objective of participation, 
information exchange. This administrative objective was aimed at bringing planners 
and the public together to share ideas and concerns (Glass, 1979; p. 182). The 
participation was a public relations exercise similar to that described by Hambleton 
as consumerism. The intent was to 'get closer to the customer' in a publicly visible 
manner but with no actual transfer of decisionmaking power (Hambleton, 1988; p. 
125). 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee became a minor elite organisation supported 
by public mandate. This mandate and its strong professional membership, placed it 
in a strong position to assert influence over future development projects such as the 
Hobart Civic Square. Its successful mobilisation encouraged it to demand a greater 
say in the decisionmaking processes in Sullivans Cove. After the Sheraton 
International Hotel debate had run its course it changed its structure from a 
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Committee to an Association to allow it to become involved with more than one issue 
in the Cove. The public, through the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee, had had a 
taste of what could be achieved when it mobilised against the Sheraton International 
Hotel. The next major issue, the Hobart Civic Square, would be approached by the 
public and its action group in a more confident manner. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study 2- The Civic Square. 
4.1. Introduction. 
A Hobart civic square was first proposed in 1811 (Civic Forum, Mr. Barry McNeill; 
17/8/89). The present site was highlighted in the ambitious but largely ignored and 
unsealed 1945 City of Hobart Plan which suggested that Constitution and Victoria 
Docks be filled in and used as building sites (Cook, 1945; p.46). 
The idea of a Civic Square for Hobart on the present proposed site bounded by 
Davey, Elizabeth, Morrison and Argyle Streets evolved during the 1950s. The Hobart 
City Council began its purchase of private property within the site during this time. It 
was to be a civic space for large formal events and community gatherings. The 
square was seen as a way of opening the city to the water. (Refer to Map 2 which 
shows the location of the Hobart Civic Square Site) 
In 1974 the Hobart City Council held a public design competion on the proposed civic 
square. No structured guidelines were developed for the competition. Most of the 
ideas put forward by the public had strong ties to yachting and the early history of 
Hobart's waterfront. Suggestions included a meeting place, a music bowl, a quiet 
resting place, a place for tourist developments, and botanical displays (The Mercury; 
21/7/88). The continuing rapid structural change in the Sullivans Cove area during 
the 1970s encouraged the main landowners, the Hobart City Council, the State 
Government and the Hobart Marine Board to sponsor the development of planning 
studies. 
4.2. Planning Studies on Sullivans Cove and the Civic Square. 
The following section discusses the resultant studies and their relationship to the 
concept of a civic square for Hobart. They included the 1979 Sullivans Cove Study, 
the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, the 1984 edition of the 1982 draft City 
of Hobart Planning Scheme and the 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail  and 
Bicentennial Walking Trail Study. Two other studies were also relevant to the 
Sullivans Cove area and will be discussed below in their Sullivans Cove context. 






Map 2 : The Hobart Civic Square Site 
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Central Area Traffic and Parkina Study. The Battery Point Planning Scheme is also 
concerned with part of the Sullivans Cove precinct although it does not directly affect 
the civic square or Sheraton International hotel sites. 
4.2.1. The 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study. 
The 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study (DRTS) was published by the 
Department of Main Roads. Its findings were to have a major impact on the Sullivans 
Cove area. It claimed to concentrate on local problems rather than emphasising 
regional strategies because the network of primary arterial outlet roads was nearly 
completed and there was perceived low growth and limited development 
opportunities in the broader Derwent region. The study outlined a proposed 
development scheme for Sullivans Cove with the primary purpose of enhancing 
redevelopment opportunities by dividing the area into sensible development blocks. 
The Davey Street extension was part of this development scheme. Traffic flow and 
circulation was incidental (DRTS, 1978; 2). (Refer to Map 3 which shows the location 
of Davey Street) 
The 1979 Sullivans Cove Study was not consistent with the land use and 
development implications of the 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study. It 
recommended against the proposed Davey Street extension. It suggested a 
comprehensive pedestrian network connecting Battery Point, Sullivans Cove and the 
city (SCS, 1979; pp. vi - vii). The pedestrian network was eventually adopted as the 
Bicentennial Walking Trail developed in the Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and 
Bicentennial Walking Trail Study in1988 (discussed below). 
In direct contrast the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study accepted the road 
and traffic proposals outlined in the 1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study and 
tailored its planning and design concepts to the expected ramifications of the Davey 
Street extension. It also suggested traffic management measures for the civic square 
site. The 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study endorsed the 
additional traffic management measures developed in the 1983 Study. 
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BROOKER AVENUE 
Map 3: The Davey Street extension. It was to enhance redevelopment opportunities rather than 
solve traffic problems 
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4.2.2. The 1979 Sullivens Cove Study. 
The 1979 Sullivans Cove Study, prepared for the Hobart City Council, was the first to 
suggest a commercial component for the civic square. It suggested the provision of 
cultural activities for the people of Hobart which could be supported by some small 
scale office and commercial development. It did not provide clear urban design 
details for the civic square (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). 
A Council officer's report on the 1979 Study commented on the inclusion of a number 
of potential uses for the civic square site: 
In contrast to its original purpose as a 'permanent window towards 
the harbour i.e. parklands, the report recommends that the site is 
well situated to provide some or all the recreational facilities to city 
workers and visitors. A restaurant or tavern facility, a community 
information centre associated with major public events and some 
offices and street level commercial facilities to name a few. 
This change in thinking from a single function facility to the multi-
functional development suggested by the Sullivans Cove report 
reflects the evolution and recognition of the Sullivans Cove precinct 
as a unique opportunity to develop a framework within which land use 
in the study area can be co-ordinated and effectively controlled. 
A development incorporating such a range of activities and oriented 
towards the promotion of the Sullivans Cove area could be developed 
by a joint public/commercial venture and with approximately 
$600,000 already invested in the project, some monetary gains would 
be preferable. To minimise further expenditure and to keep the 
guidelines of the report concerning historically important buildings, 
the Piesse and Co. building and if possible the Chesterman building 
should be retained. 
(Refer to Plate 4, p. 57 illustrating the Chesterman Buildings and the Piesse and Co. building) 
4.2.3. The 1983 Su!livens Cove Urban Design Study. 
The 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study (SCUDS) was prepared by Mr. Alf 
Lester from Lester Firth and Associates, a Canberra based architectural firm, for the 
Sullivans Cove Development Authority. The 1983 Study confined its comments on 
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Plate 4 : The Chesterman buildings (in the foreground) and the Piesse and Co. building (cream brick to the rear of the Chesterman buildings). 
Both are classified by the National Trust (Tasmania). 
the civic square site to suggested design concepts and did not support the retention 
of the buildings on the site (SCUDS, 1983; p. 127). 
4.2.4. The City of Hobart's Planning Scheme. 
The Hobart City Council's (HCC) 1982 draft Planning Scheme's statement on the 
desired future character of the Sullivans Cove Precinct as a Conservation Zone was 
particularly relevant to the development of the Civic Square site, especially with 
regard to the subsequent changes to the Planning Scheme's Codes: 
Development in the Sullivan's Cove Precinct should respect and 
reinforce its primary conservation status as the first place of 
permanent settlement in Hobart, its role in the early development of 
the City, and its intimate relationship with the waterfront 	 
The entire waterfrontage of the Precinct must be conserved for its 
historic and architectural importance in the townscape of the City. 
Any new buildings should maintain or complete the existing two or 
three storey wall around the Cove and complement its primary 
geometric forms. 
Elsewhere in the Precinct new buildings should have a maximum 
height of four storeys, be built to the street frontage and be 
sympathetic to historic built form. New development should not 
detract from any existing vistas or views within the area. Materials 
and colour schemes should reflect the predominately lighter colour 
and mellow tones of older buildings. (HCC, 1984; pp. 24-25) 
On November 25, 1985 the Conservation Zone of Sullivans Cove in the 1982 Draft 
City of Hobart Planning Scheme was modified by the Council by special resolution. 
The civic square site was now the only site in the Sullivans Cove Precinct not to be 
included in a Conservation Zone (Hobart City Council Codes; Conservation Zone No. 
1). This excision would allow for the demolition of the Chesterman buildings and the 
Piesse and Co. building, if necessary, during any redevelopment of the site, and 
would also allow planning flexibility regarding the height of any buildings (Personal 
communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). 
In late 1989 the Hobart City Council was in the process of resubmitting the draft City  
of Hobart Planning Scheme to the Commissioner for Town and Country Planning for 
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sealing. The sections dealing with Sullivans Cove and the Central City area, in 
particular, were being modified (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89 
and Mr. Barry McNeill, 18/10/89). 
4.2.5. The 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study. 
The 1985 Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study (HoCAS) prepared for the 
Hobart City Council and the Department of Main Roads accepted and adopted the 
traffic studies by Mr. Alf Lester for Sullivans Cove in the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban 
Design Study, but commented: 
It is predicted that by 1995 the ability of the central road network, 
modified by the Davey Street extension project, in coping with 
forecast peak hour traffic demands will be marginal to 
unsatisfactory (HoCAS, 1985; p. iv). 
4.2.6. The 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study. 
The 1987 Sullivans Cove Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study was 
prepared by Hobart Consultants Leigh Woolley, John Hepper and Jerry deGryse for 
the Sullivans Cove Development Authority. Like the 1983 SuDivans Cove Urban 
Design Study, it confined its comments on the civic square to supporting the 
accepted multi-functional use of the site (the design concepts echoed those of the 
1974 public competition). 
4.3. A Preliminary Look at the Public's Role 
The concept of a multi-functional civic square development was provided with a 
relatively Consistent set of guidelines for potential developers by the 1979 Sullivans 
Cove Study, the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, the 1987 Sullivans Cove 
Urban Detail and Bicentennial Walking Trail Study as well as relevant sections in the 
1982 Draft Hobart City Planning Scheme, the Davey Street extension outlined in the 
1978 Derwent Region Transportation Study and the subsequent additions in the1985 
Hobart Central Area Traffic and Parking Study, Most of the reports were pragmatic in 
that they reflected the development requirements of the public bodies involved with 
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the Cove (especially the Hobart City Council) during the time of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). 
The planning studies discussed above were released and distributed to professional 
bodies which were invited to comment. The public was also able to comment but its 
response was negligible. This was a typical reaction to the release of planning 
documents before the development of the Sheraton Hotel. The public would soon 
show its awareness of Sullivans Cove and the Civic Square issue and its 
preparedness to become more involved in deciding future developments. 
The growing awareness of development proposals for Sullivans Cove was reflected 
in the public's reaction to the proposed civic square in the late 1980s. The change in 
concept from an open, green space to a developer-lead commercial scheme 
providing free public amentities to the Hobart City Council was to prove unacceptable 
to the people of Hobart. Once again, and in a surprisingly short time after the 
Sheraton International Hotel row, the public voice was heard. This time the outcome 
would be different. The development proposal would be modified and then withdrawn 
by the developers who would then announce their intention to involve the public 
much earlier in discussions for any new scheme. 
At present the debate in the planning and political sectors of the community suggests 
that a new study needs to be commissioned to review and combine the previous 
Studies into one workable planning document. Others argue that each document 
fulfills a different purpose and needs to be an individual entity. Yet others argue that 
Sullivans Cove should not have a planning scheme separate from the rest of the city, 
and that any planning scheme for Sullivans Cove (and Battery Point) should be 
incorporated into the Hobart City Council Planning Scheme to ensure consistent and 
systematic planning. 
This debate is anticipated to become more fervent because the Sullivans Cove 
Development Authority was circulating a draft brief for a Sullivans Cove Urban 
Design and Planning Review. This Review will look at the existing documents, 
especially the 1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study which is recognised by the 
Sullivans Cove Development Authority as having severe limitations with 'too few 
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guiding principles, too many site-specific preconceptions and some guidelines that 
may have been inappropriate' (Review Brief, 1989; p.3). 
4.4. The Civic Square in the Late 1980s. 
The following discussion focuses on the development of the civic square in the late 
1980s. It outlines the series of events leading to the developers withdrawing their 
(revised) plans, in order to provide data for analysing the decisonmaking process. 
4.4.1. Introduction. 
In November 1986 the Hobart City Council announced that it had decided to 
establish a multi-million dollar waterfront civic square development one block away 
from the Sheraton International Hotel. The Council planned to offer a suitable 
business group a substantial part of the land free in exchange for the provision of a 
civic square (The Mercury; 27/11/86). 
The Tasmanian chapter of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects (RAIA) had 
initially suggested to the Council that a design competition be held before calling for 
commercial interest but this was rejected by the Council as too costly, time 
consuming and likely to produce financial and administrative complications. The 
competition would be for commercial developers only (The Mercury; 6/7/88). Prize 
money of $60,000 was to be offered for the winning entry (Personal communication, 
Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). 
During November 1986 the Hobart City Council announced it was negotiating with 
the Hobart Marine Board for extra land on the civic square site, which was bounded 
by Davey, Elizabeth, Morrison and Argyle Streets, with no waterfrontage (The  
Mercury; 28/11/86). In July 1987 a land exchange was confirmed. The Hobart Marine 
Board would take control of, and have the right to obtain income from, the section of 
Hunter Street between the Centre for the Arts and Davey Street which had been 
previously controlled by the Council. A pedestrian area would be jointly developed in 
Hunter Street by the State Government which would contribute $150,000, and the 
Hobart City Council, which would contribute $100,000. In exchange the Hobart City 
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Council's proposed civic square could be next to Constitution Dock and cover parts 
of Argyle and Morrison Streets (The Mercury; 8/7/87). 
The swap was a fairly controversial decision as the section of Hunter Street, known 
as Old Wharf, passing into the Hobart Marine Board ownership was to have been a 
pedestrian mall (SCUDS; p.127) or a multi-purpose concourse (SCUDS; p.132) 
consisting of widened footpaths and carparking (The Mercury; 1017/87). 
During October 1987 the Hobart City Council held official launches for the Civic 
Square competition in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane as well as Hobart, inviting 
potential interstate and Tasmanian developers to show expressions of interest in the 
development (The Mercury; 19/10/87, Personal communication, Mr. Peter Curtis, 
16/10/89). The interstate launch included a marketing package which cost the 
Council $50,000. It consisted of a 10 minute video, an extensive guideline manual, 
and a colourful prospectus showing the features of the site (The Southern Star; 
4/11/87). 
The financial package developed by the Council consisted of a lease on the 7,500 
m2, $3.5 million site to the developer free of charge in exchange for public facilities. 
The development was to be half commercial, and half a significant and prestigious 
public facility. A selection of four submissions would be made and the final decision 
would be given by May 1988 (The Mercury; 28/10/87). 
The State Labor Opposition member, Mr. John White, and Independent member, Dr. 
Bob Brown, argued that the square should be parkland on the waters edge and that 
the historic buildings should be preserved (Media release, 28/10/87; The Mercury; 
29/10/87). Seven buildings were to be directly affected by the proposed development 
of the site, two of which were classified by the National Trust (The Mercury; 
30/10/87). 
By the December 21, 1987 deadline for submissions, 12 proposals had been 
received by Council. Four were shortlisted during January. Alderman Barry Fisher 
sought to head off criticism by assuring Hobart people that: 
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We're trying hard not to get the same problems that the Sheraton had. 
We want to give people what they want (The Southern Star; 6/1/88). 
In February 1988 the HCC announced their chosen proposals. They were: 
1. Bond Corp - architects Mitchell, Giurgola and Thorp who designed 
Australia's new Parliament House in Canberra. 
Bond Corp's $30 million 'Central Public Plaza Concept' consisted of 
a series of buildings surrounding a central plaza. It had a seven-
storey building as tall as the Marine Board building nearby and two 
low dockside buildings which were three storeys high from dock level 
and two storeys high from plaza level. These two buildings provided a 
coffee shop, restaurant and small retail spaces with the plaza level 
of the dock east building being designed as an exhibition/conference 
space. The third level was offices. The existing buildings along Davey 
Street would be replaced with a three storey structure for 
commercial and retail offices or a museum/visitor centre. The form 
and character of the buildings were intended to respond to 
the historical warehouse architecture which was unique to Hobart. 
2. Jennings Industries Ltd - architects Bates, Smart, McHutcheon in 
association with the Hobart firm Jacob, Allom and Wade. 
Jennings Industries 'Dockside Plaza' consisted of two new buildings 
- one of eight levels with areas for retail, office and specialist 
tourist facilities, and the other a replacement for existing dockside 
offices with a smaller building comprising restaurants and bars. It 
did not include an on-site carpark but proposed a decked car park with 
255 spaces away from the waterfront. It would include a 100 seat 
theatrette, a possible maritime museum, restaurants, bars, retail and 
entertainment area and a major tourist destination centre. 
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3. Lawrence Neld and Partners - this was an architectural firm which 
intended to use Leighton Contractors as their builders. They did 
not put forward a final proposal. 
4. John Holland Properties- architects Lester Firth and Associates, 
the company which produced the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study in 
1983. 
The John Holland $25 million proposal was 4 storey building around 
a public plaza fronting onto Constitution Dock. It included prestige 
offices, underground parking, a restaurant/tavern and an arcade 
leading from the plaza to Franklin Square. The plans recommended 
archaeological research and full documentation of findings. The names 
of the early buildings on the site would be used in the new 
development (The Mercury; 21/6/88). 
The four companies, chosen by four officers from the Council (including the Town 
Clerk, the Assistant Director, Architecture and Alderman Barry Fisher), were given a 
deadline of June 14, 1988 to submit their detailed submissions. The final fully 
documented proposals, which included scale models, were to be considered by three 
relevant city council committees, a special advisory body, and the public before 
going to a meeting of the full Council for a final decision. The Council also reserved 
its right to refuse all the proposals (The Mercury; 11/5/88). 
The members of the independent advisory committee were announced: Mr. Greg 
Deas, chief architect of the National Capital Development Corporation (NCDC); Mr. 
Geoff Parr, Director of the School of Art, University of Tasmania; Dr. Bruce 
Felmingham, from the Economics Department, University of Tasmania; Mr. Eric 
Hayes, Hobart Chamber of Commerce; Mrs Kristine Ancher, Sullivans Cove Citizens 
Association; and Mr. David Smith, General Manager of Finance, Tasmanian 
Development Authority (The Mercury; 21/6/88). This Independent Committee did not 
act as a formal committee. Each member submitted an individual report reflecting 
their individual expertise (Personal communication, Mr. Ken Hudspeth, 18/10/89). 
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In June 1988 the Council announced that the three final proposals would be made 
available for public viewing. The final decision would be made on September 9, 1988 
(The Mercury; 21/6/88). 
4.4.2.. The Guidelines for the Proposals 
The 1987 Council guidelines for the proposals had evolved out of a Bicentennial  
Civic Square Proposal Brief prepared for the Hobart City Council by Mr. Alf Lester in 
1985. He had prepared the Brief for the Bicentennial Proposal along the lines of his 
1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study. It was in this original brief that details of 
the commercial component thought necessary to provide the public amenities were 
outlined and the suggestion was made that a carefully-placed five-storey building 
could be accommodated on the site without affecting view lines significantly. The 
Hobart City Council prepared the subsequent guidelines (Personal communication, 
Mr. Peter Curtis, 16/10/89). The Council was not going to be bound by the draft 
planning scheme which recommended that 'any new buildings should maintain or 
complete the existing two to three-storey 'wall' around the Cove', and which stated 
that elsewhere in the Sullivans Cove area pew buildings should have a maximum of 
four 'storeys (The Mercury; 6/7/88). (Refer to Plate 3, p. 49 of Hunter Street 
illustrating the 'wall around the Cove'). 
All three developers failed to follow the guidelines. They did not provide an 
environmental impact statement even though there were five pages in the guidelines 
outlining the factors that would need to be examined. These included the existing 
use of the site, road access, and parking on and around the site, pedestrian access, 
views, and microclimate, including wind factors, shadows from the buildings, and 
protection form the rain or sun (The Mercury; 9/7/88). All the proposals failed to 
deliver the required number of carparking spaces and failed to establish a link 
between the square and the rest of the city. Many people also considered that the 
plans failed to blend in with the architecture of the area (The Sunday Tasmanian; 
10/7/08). Each developer stipulated that the title of the land would go to the 
developers (The Mercury; 21R/88). 
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4.4.3. Public Comment 
Public comment on the three shortlisted proposals on display was not slow to arrive. 
Over 1000 questionnaires were filled in during the first four days of the exhibition. 
The Town Clerk announced the final figures from a total of 4,669 questionnaires: 
about 80% favoured the John Holland proposal, 12% the Bond Corporation's, and 
8% the Jennings proposal. He said that a significant proportion had indicated they 
favoured none of the submissions but that their comments indicated that they would 
favour one of the proposals if modifications were made (The Mercury; 18/8/88). The 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust claimed 40% of the people wrote on the 
questionnaires that they preferred none of the proposals even though there was not 
a 'no development' preference on the questionnaire. The John Holland proposal was 
nominated as the most acceptable because of its lesser height. 
The Lord Mayor assured the public that the Council had not reached a decision and 
that the option of returning to the drawing board remained. She emphasised that the 
Council had gone to considerable length to ensure maximum public input Wig 
Mercury; 28/6/88). This was despite comments made by Mr. Barry McNeill, president 
of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects (Tasmanian Chapter), earlier in the year 
that the Council had not provided sufficent opportunity for public discussion on the 
design guidelines for the civic square project and that it would be costly and 
inefficient if the rules were to be changed at the end of the exercise (The Mercury; 
25/3/88). 
In a Letter to the Editor (The Mercury; 1/7/88), a reader explained his point of view: 
The main problem which the Town Hall is facing at present with its 
proposed civic square is that it used competitive submissions by 
commercial interests to seek answers to civic issues which were 
never properly discussed and articulated in the first place. 
4.4.4. The Su!livens Cove Citizens Association (SCCA) 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association consists of private members and 
representatives of affiliated organisations. It is recognised by all authorities 
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associated with planning Sullivans Cove. The Association was formed in 1986 by 
members of the earlier citizens Committee that arose from a public meeting to 
express community opinions on the international hotel. 
In December 1987 the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association responded to the Hobart 
City Council's announcement of plans for the development of the civic square. It had 
recommended that the Council 
amend its schedule, accept some delay and permit effective public 
discussions on its Civic Square proposals before proceeding to the 
next stage of the planning (The Mercury; 18/12/87). 
It called on the Council to inform the public and seek its opinions before competing 
developers spent time and money on proposals that would inevitably create 
controversy. It had welcomed the assurance that the public would be invited to 
comment on the four shortlisted submissions but pointed out that this would be six 
months after the proposals had been developed. 
The Association also outlined several matters of concern (The Mercury; 18/12/87): 
1. The Council had rejected the suggestion of a public meeting to 
explain the project and the Association had been denied access to the 
guidelines to developers until after the public promotion launch. This 
happened despite a request early in 1987 to contribute constructively 
to discussions of proposals before they were implemented rather than 
criticising them afterwards. 
2. Council consultation appeared to be narrowly restricted to 
authorities such as the State Government, the Marine Board of Hobart, 
the Sullivans Cove Development Authority and the professional 
institutes of planners and architects. Civic proposals should be open 
to citizen contribution. 
3. The SCCA was surprised that the guidelines prepared by council 
seemed to adhere almost totally to the brief outline proposal and 
freehand sketches of the Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study of 1983, 
prepared by a mainland consultant. 
4. Ratepayers have not been asked whether they would accept the cost 
through normal financing procedures. 
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5. The glossy prospectus and the supporting videotape promoted the 
waterfront site as a target for commercial developers. Only at 
'small-print' stage, the guidelines and performance standards 
prepared by council officers, did the required-for provision of civic 
amenities appear. The prospectus itself did not mention the civic 
component. 
6. Continuing use of the title 'Civic Square' was misleading and 
inappropriate. 
The Association emphatically recommended to the City Council: 
1. That none of the proposed developments - Bond, Jennings or 
John Holland - be accepted by the Council; and 
2. That a moratorium be declared on further major development 
proposals in the Sullivans Cove precinct and its environs until a 
cohesive strategy plan for the area had been prepared. 
4.4.5. The Hobart City Council's Position. 
In August 1988 the Hobart City Council decided in favour of the John Holland 
Properties proposal on the basis that 72% (the Lord Mayor Doone Kennedy's figure) 
of the respondents to the council's questionnaire were in favour of the development 
and that it was the only developer willing to modify its designs. Amended guidelines 
were subsequently drawn up by the Hobart City Counsellors and submitted to John 
Holland representatives. Height, form, unsympathetic architecture, loss of views and 
carparking were all discussed by the Council in the formulation of the new guidelines. 
The Victorian manager of John Holland, Mr. Jeff Holloway, foresaw no difficulty in 
amending the design to take account of community concern (The Mercury; 26/8/88). 
Almost immediately there were calls for the amended guidelines to be released for 
public comment. It was suggested that the Council should develop the site itself (The  
Mercury; 31/8/88). In September 1988 a committee of four aldermen, including 
Alderman Andrew Hurburgh who had been vocal in his criticisms of the way the 
previous Civic Square committee had operated, was appointed to negotiate the 
design of the square with John Holland Properties. The new committee would 
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consider the objections against the original design and look at ways to make the 
development more sympathetic with the character of its surroundings (The Mercury; 
28/9/88). 
, In November 1988 John Holland Properties displayed a new model of the 
development to the Hobart City Council's sub-committee and council technical staff. 
The development was reduced in mass and had a hip roof configuration (The 
Mercury; 15/11/88). 
In May 1989 it was announced that the 'drastically revised proposal' for the civic 
square would be finalised at a forthcoming council committee meeting. Alderman 
Andrew Hurburgh claimed the new submission would be widely accepted because of 
the 'vigorous planning and development stage and the unprecendented level of 
public input'. He described the new design by Canberra-based architect-planner Mr. 
Alf Lester, who he said was recognised as a 'guru of Sullivans Cove', as very 
attractive and said it 'looked like Hobart'. He also announced that the ownership of 
the site was to remain Council property (The Mercury; 20/5/89). 
A John Holland spokesman later claimed the new proposal contained many of the 
elements of the previous submission (The Australian; 10-11/6/89). Changes included 
a greater proportion of public space and increased parking; a reduction in height and 
bulk by changing the plan into interlinked buildings, and the use of stepped levels 
and hip roofs to change the lines of the building; and the use of sandstone and other 
materials from existing historic buildings on the site (which were to be demolished) 
(The Australian; 24-25/6/89). 
In late June 1989, the Hobart City Council approved the new proposal and decided 
to let it go through the normal planning procedures. The people would decide if the 
the new design was acceptable. It would go on public display (Personal 
communication, Mr. Peter Curtis; 16/10/89). 
The State Labor Party announced that it would impose a moratorium on all major 
waterfront development if it formed a government with the Green Independents after 
the resumption of State Parliament (The Australian; 24-25/6/89). During the Council 
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meeting of August 29, 1989 the Hobart City Councillors who supported the idea of a 
moratorium on development in Sullivans Cove lost a vote 5 - 7 that a moratorium 
should be imposed (Theliemay ; 29/8/89). 
The new proposal for the civic square development was put on display for public 
comment from the 7th to the 28th August, 1989. A decision on the development was 
expected at the September 21 Council meeting. Public debate raged over the plans 
and the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association held a public forum on August 17, 1989 
to gauge public reaction. 
4.4.6. The Civic Square Forum - August 17, 1989 
The Civic Square Forum was held on August 17, 1989. The importance of the public 
being informed about development proposals was emphasised and the problems 
with the John Holland proposal explained. The public had misjudged the 
ramifications of the lower height. If the height was reduced, the bulk would be 
increased. The Council was attempting to get civic amentities without civic cost but 
the contenders were compensating for this civic space by including greater 
commercial space. After taking a year to modify the original design the developers 
had not made any substantial changes. 
It was suggested that Council 'start again', that the relevant planning schemes be 
reviewed, and the people of Hobart should be given a chance to define what they 
wanted for their waterfront. The Forum asked: Did Hobart need a civic square or 
public space? If so, where and what type? Was Constitution Dock a suitable site? 
What public activities could it be used for? What other use other than retail and 
commercial could be developed on that site? Had the closing of the roads been 
examined properly, taking into account the change in traffic flow? An alternative 
would be to close the roads for special occasions. What are the public's views on the 
demolition of the existing buildings? Was it going to be the pride of Hobart? 
Aldermen Barry Fisher and Andrew Hurburgh assured those attending that the 
Council was 'bending over to get it right' but the concept of green grass and trees 
had gone. The commercial component would make it a busy, active place. Beauty 
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was in the eye of the beholder and differences of opinion were expected. The 
Council was still responding as best it could to useful, intelligent input. Everyone 
wanted the best result for the citizens of Hobart. Council was open to the 
appreciation of the problems but the 'buck' stopped at the Aldermen and the 
Planning Appeals Board. The Aldermen needed input and courage to make the 
decisions. 
Alderman Hurburgh pointed out that this meeting was a learning experience for the 
Council in that it was the first time Council had gone to the public and said, 'What do 
you think?' He pointed out that people do not use the Cove because of the hostile 
climate. What was needed was a warm, friendly sheltered space. Historically it was a 
commercial site and this use was being renewed. Hobart had a lot of parks and 
space that were not used and in this case commercialism and public space fitted 
together. Council wanted to hear the public's views and involve them in public 
projects. 
The representative for John Holland and architect for the development, Mr. Alf 
Lester, commented that he respected legitimate concern and was sensitive to the 
opportunity to hear public opinion. The proposal had taken a large amount of thought 
and he felt that the quay had given the civic square concept an identity which would 
attract locals and tourists and which could be used as a forum for artistic expression 
and creative pursuits as well as for maritime architecture. He commented that this 
development was enjoying the most exhaustive public participation he had ever 
experienced. 
The audience of about 200 was assured by the Councillors that there was no 
commitment to develop the site. If the development was approved there were tight 
guidelines on the title to the building, possible redevelopment in 30-40 years and the 
return of ownership to Council after 99 years. 
The Civic Square Forum seemed to act as a catalyst for opposition to the proposed 
civic square. Increased and continued opposition was reflected in Letters to the 
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Editor in the The Mercury newspaper especially, and calls for a moratorium on 
development in the Cove. 
4.4.7. The John Holland Properties Pty. Ltd. Position 
On September 14, 1989, John Holland Properties Pty. Ltd. announced that it would 
scrap its plans for the civic square and go back to the drawing board. John Holland 
Properties decided to withdraw its proposal before it could be voted on by the 
Hobart City Council during the September 21 Council meeting as 'it felt it was 
inappropriate to put the Council in an invidious position of voting against a proposal 
in which it had invested a great deal of time and energy' (The Mercury; 14/9/89). 
Mr. Grant Archibald, John Holland properties Chief Executive, said the decision was 
in response to a groundswell of opposition to its proposal. He believed the initial 
design guidelines were too rigid and fixed and he was seeking to reenter 
negotiations with the Council to have the guidelines relaxed to allow it to design a 
proposal which would take into account the will and wishes of the public (The  
Mercury; 14/9/89). He emphasised that John Holland Properties had not pulled out 
altogether as it was the preferred developer and the Council had a commitment to 
use the company for the civic square development (ABC Radio; 15/9/89). 
4.5. Summary of the Hobart Civic Square Case Study 
The history of events for the Hobart Civic Square case study is far more complex 
than that for the Sheraton International Hotel. In contrast with the Sheraton 
International Hotel, the Hobart Civic Square concept evolved out of community 
expectations and its development was a culmination of events over a long time 
period. These events included relevant background planning studies as well as the 
development of a multi-functional concept for the square during the 1980s. 
In 1986 the Hobart• City Council announced its decision to establish a multi-million 
dollar waterfront Civic Square development which would incorporate a commercial 
component as well as public facilities. The multifunctional concept combined with 
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some public facilities was proposed in both the 1979 Sullivans Cove Study and the 
1983 Sullivans Cove Urban Design Study, neither of which included widespread 
public comment. The Hobart City Council appeared to rely on these two studies for 
justification for the concept of the Civic Square, rather than risking a repeat of the 
1974 design competition. No public comment was invited or heeded at this stage of 
the decisionmaking process. 
The Hobart City Council and the State Government negotiated with the Hobart 
Marine Board for a $250,000 land swap to extend the Civic Square site to the water 
and dock edge. The land swap aroused considerable controversy. No public input 
had been invited and no details of the lengthy decisionmaking process were made 
available. 
The Hobart City Council relied on the recommendations of the 1983 Sullivans Cove 
Urban Design Study and the subsequent Bicentennial Square Proposal Brief in 
preparing the 1987 Guidelines and Performance Standards for the proposed Civic 
Square development. The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association and other 
professional groups were informed of the Standards before the competition was 
announced and were invited to a confidential briefing, but were allowed no input. 
Twelve civic square proposals were entered in the competition. Four were shortlisted 
by Hobart City Council officers. The Hobart City Council announced that these 
proposals were to be considered by three relevant City Council committees, a 
special advisory body and the public before going to Council for a final decision. 
There was no information or explanation of what factors would be taken into account 
or how any public comment would be considered. 
The Hobart City Council found itself in a difficult position as both landlord and the 
planning body making the decision on the development. The Council, as landlord, 
was involved in long, protracted tenure negotiations and allowed no public input into 
its role as developer of the Civic Square site. Formal participation procedures on 
planning matters were to be the only opportunity for the public to have its say. 
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One of the four shortlisted proposals was withdrawn. Of the three proposals which 
produced concepts for the Civic Square, none adhered to the Guidelines and 
Performance Standards for the development, none provided an environmental 
impact statement, kept to height restrictions or provided the minimum number of 
carparking spaces. 
The Guidelines and Performance Standards were not released for public scrutiny 
prior to, or during the time for the public to comment on the development proposals. 
The public had to choose between the three proposals presented to them. There 
was no option to reject all. 
The public appeared to choose the John Holland Properties proposal which was 
least in height. According to the Hobart City Council estimates at the time, 72% or 
80% (both figures were quoted) of people responding to the questionnaire chose the 
John Holland proposal. Of these, 40% indicated on the questionnaire that they 
preferred none of the proposals. 
After the time elapsed for public comment the Hobart City Council announced the 
John Holland Properties proposal as the preferred development. In fact, John 
Holland Properties was the only developer willing to modify the design, and go ahead 
without pre-commitments to the proposed office space within the development. 
The . Hobart City Council appointed an aldermanic committee to negotiate 
modifications suggested by the public reactions to the John Holland Properties 
proposal. The developers proved unwilling to make extensive changes to the design. 
The Hobart City Council decided to let the public decide if the modifications were 
adequate and organised another public exhibition showing the original John Holland 
proposal and the modified one. The modified proposal showed little change from the 
original design. 
The aldermanic committee provided for no public input. The negotiations entered into 
by the committee with the developer were not entirely related to planning matters. 
Council, as the landowner, still had tenure and development details to sort out with 
the developer and these appeared to take priority over planning matters. 
74 
The Sullivans Cove Citizens Association held a Civic Forum which came out against 
the_modified design. At the public meeting, the developers, Council and the public 
were invited to participate and express their respective views. 
Again, a public meeting proved to be the catalyst for opposition to a development in 
the Sullivans Cove precinct. The questions asked at the Civic Square public meeting 
highlighted the lack of information released and discussed by the Hobart City 
Council, the lack of flexibility in the Council's decisionmaking processes, and its 
ignorance of public participation techniques. The public's reaction was to call for a 
moratorium on the Civic Square proposal and on all development in the Cove until a 
strategy plan was prepared. 
John. Holland Properties withdrew their proposal soon after this meeting. They 
claimed the initial guidelines were the cause of the public's rejection of their design. 
They called for new guidelines that incorporated public input. 
In both the Sheraton International Hotel and Hobart Civic Square developments the 
public was given the opportunity to comment only on what the government and 
planners had conceptualised beforehand. There was little or no effort to find out what 
the public wanted. In the case of the Sheraton International Hotel the final result was 
a compromise in design, but the Hobart Civic Square was postponed. 
4.6. Analysis of Participation. 
The Hobart Civic Square was to have been a showpiece in public participation for the 
Hobart City Council. The Hobart Civic Square development would not emulate the 
International Hotel public participation 'debacle'. There would be opportunities for 
formal public participation. 
There was no public input into the original multi-functional design concept, the 
guidelines or the choice of the shortlisted proposals. Although the public was able to 
participate in the final choice, the guidelines were not made available to enable 
informed comment on the three designs. Although the public indicated its preference 
for the John Holland proposal, it had little effect on the final decision. The Council's 
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'preferred' developer, John Holland Properties, was the only one willing to modify its 
design after the public participation process. 
The public was expected to accept very minor modifications to the original design as 
proof that its participation had made a difference. No formal public input had been 
allowed into the revised guidelines and the developers withdrew the development 
before public comment could be assessed or incorporated into the modified proposal. 
Once again, the public was invited to 'participate in participation' which complied to 
Arnstein's definition of consultation. The Hobart City Council assured the public that 
their concerns and ideas would be taken into consideration. This assurance elevated 
participation in this project to Arnstein's level of placation. Arnstein defined placation  
as consultation with some degree of influence. It appeared as the fourth rung on her 
eight rung 'Ladder'. She regarded this level of participation as 'tokenism' because the 
authority still retained the right to make the final decision (Arnstein, 1969; p. 219). 
Burke's review and comment category, in which public comment is invited but no 
commitment is made by the planning authority to alter or modify the plan, is 
applicable to the Civic Square proposal. The Council did exercise its right to take 
public comment into account and asked the developer to modify its design. 
Unfortunately, the Council prepared the guidelines for the modification without public 
participation. Thus the level of participation was not elevated to Burke's next 
category of consultation s in which public representatives were recruited and their 
specific advice sought (Burke, 1979; pp. 74-75). 
The minor modifications made by the developer were a reflection of the revised 
guidelines. These revised guidelines may have concentrated on other constraints, 
such as financial matters, rather than planning or public input. The developers 
withdrew their revised proposal after the public meeting called in response to the 
modified design and requested that the guidelines be 'relaxed' to allow the proposal 
to take account of public opinion. This 'relaxation' could have boosted the 
participation process to a level involving a transfer of decisionmaking power from the 
Hobart City Council to the public. 
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The participation process appeared to conform to Glass' information exchange  
theory as evidenced by the presence of developer and Council representatives at the 
public meeting called by the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association. Glass' theory 
assumed the developing authority would initiate this exchange. In fact the action 
group brought the parties together for the purposes of 'sharing ideas and concerns' 
(Glass, 1979; p. 182). 
The result of this public meeting was a call, by the Sullivans Cove Citizens 
Association, for a moratorium on all development in the Cove. Soon after the public 
meeting developer withdrew its proposal. By bringing the planners and the public 
together for the purpose of 'sharing ideas and concerns' the Sullivans Cove Citizens 
Association highlighted obvious problems not previously acknowledged by the 
Council. Knowledge of public sentiment appeared to be a significant factor in the 
withdrawal of the proposal by the developers, although it is unknown what other 
factors were operating to precipitate the withdrawal. Information was exchanged but 
was not planner initiated as intended by Glass' objective. 
The withdrawal of the proposal was an unsatisfactory result for all concerned. The 
idea for a civic square for Hobart had been around for a very long time. The public 
appeared to support the concept of the Civic Square and would have embraced the 
opportunity to participate in the development of an acceptable design. This was 
shown by the enthusiastic response to the 1974 design competition and the 
response to the invitation to participate in the latter stages of the John Holland 
proposal. The public participation process offered by the Hobart City Council in the 
Hobart Civic Square development was a consumerist public relations exercise as 
described by Hambleton (1988; p. 125) with no actual transfer of decisionmaking 
power. 
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION. 
5.1. Discussion 
Public participation in the decisionmaking processes of the two cases studies in 
Sullivans Cove was the responsibility of the Hobart City Council. The State 
Government openly admitted during the Sheraton International Hotel debate that it 
did not have the mechanisms to cope with public participation. When pressured by 
the public for input it handed the problem to the Hobart City Council. 
The Hobart City Council accepted the responsibility with some conditions. It limited 
its involvement in the Sheraton debate by ensuring that it could not be held to its own 
Planning Scheme's statement on Sullivans Cove as a conservation zone and 
requested that the State Government legislate to fast-track the development. In 
contrast, the Hobart Civic Square proposal was a Hobart City Council inspired 
development and was its own responsibility. 
Public participation in the Hobart Civic Square development was promoted by the 
Hobart City Council as the antithesis of the Sheraton International Hotel 
development. The Council announced there would be ample opportunity for the 
public to participate in the Civic Square proposal, unlike the Sheraton International 
Hotel debate. In reality, the two case studies were very similiar. 
Similarities and differences in the progress of both developments are apparent when 
examining Table 1. In both case studies four design proposals were shortlisted with 
no public input into the choice of designs or their original briefing documents. 
Following the selection of a winning design, no real public participation was allowed 
in either project's respective revised guidelines despite the initial impetus for 
modifications coming from public reaction. 
The Hobart City Council did not release information that may have influenced public 
comment in either case study. The International Hotel's Site Development Brief  and 
the Civic Square's Guidelines and Performance Standards were not made available 
to the public. No public education was attempted to help people make informed 
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Sheraton International Hotel 
Guidelines for development (no pp) 
4 Shortlisted designs (no pp) 
Winner chosen (no pp) 
Public Meeting 
Revised guidelines (no pp) 
Compromise development 
on public display (pp) 
Modified design accepted 
by Hobart City Council 
Hobart Civic Square  
Guidlines for development (no pp) 
4 Shortlisted designs (no pp) 
Winner chosen (pp) 
Revised guidelines (no pp) 
Modified development on 
public display (pp) 
Public meeting 
Modified design withdrawn 
by the developer 
Fast-track legislation introduced by the 
State Government 
decisions on the proposals and in neither case did public opinion make a further 
difference to the final design that was put on display. 
Table 1: The Major Stages in each Case Study (The occurance or not of formal 
public participation procedures shown as pp or no pp) 
The differences in the progress of the two developments occur on two occasions. 
The public was involved in choosing the winning design of the Civic Square but not 
the International Hotel. The Sheraton International Hotel proposal's fast-track 
legislation secured a positive outcome for the State Government by preventing the 
right of appeal. The modified International hotel proposal therfore proceeded without 
further delays. The Hobart Civic Square development was not subject to fast-track 
legislation. It may be assumed that had the developer not withdrawn, delays could 
have been anticipated due to public appeals. 
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The public's reaction to the State Government's International Hotel proposal was to 
give a mandate to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee. This Committee was 
made up of professional people, particularly architects and planners, various 
organisations and the public. The Committee achieved limited access to information 
not made available to the general public and was vocal in its criticisms and 
suggestions for improvements to the design. This community involvement affected 
the outcome but only to the extent that the original proposal was redesigned. 
The public's reaction to the Hobart City Council's Civic Square proposal was to give 
a mandate to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association which had evolved from the 
previous Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee. As in the International Hotel case 
study, this group gained access to information not released to the general public and 
was consulted during the redesign stages, but it did not obviously effect the outcome 
to any degree. 
From the administrative perspective, the formal public participation processes were 
used as information exchange  and possibly as a technique to build support for the 
developments. At no stage in either case study did the Hobart City Council or the 
State Government appear to make genuine attempts to educate the public. They did 
not use participation as a planning tool. They did not even attempt to coopt their 
most vocal critics the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee or the Sullivans Cove 
Citizens Association. Its public relations efforts to convince the public that it was 
being taken into account could have been related to Hambleton's consumerism  
approach. 
The respective claims by the State Government and the Hobart City Council that the 
public had had adequate input to the International Hotel proposal, and that the public 
had had unprecedented and vigorous input which resulted in a drastically revised 
Civic Square proposal, did not hold up under examination. It would appear that the 
State Government and the Hobart City Council are relatively ignorant of public 
participation techniques. They mistook media attention for public input. 
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From the public's perspective, in both cases, the Council barely met Burke's 
requirements for review and comment, whilst its efforts can be found at the lower 
levels of Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation. The public was given the right to 
be heard but not heeded in the International Hotel proposal whereas the Hobart Civic 
Square proposal was only marginally above this level of consultation. The Council 
assurances that the public would be heeded raised the participation to the level of 
placation. Both levels of consultation and placation were regarded by Arnstein as 
tokenism. In neither case was the public or the action groups representing it given 
the power to ensure their views were heard. 
Of the four main theorists discussed in the Literature Review only Arnstein's criteria 
and description of public participation was sensitive enough to detect a difference in 
the level of participation seen in these two developments. It would appear that 
Arnstein's criteria, although developed over twenty years ago, has not yet been 
superceded as the definitive work on the assessment of the effectiveness of public 
participation. 
The Literature Review outlined some of the history and theories behind the 
development of public participation. In the United States participation was developed 
through urban renewal and poverty programs. In Britain consumerism, 
decentralisation and the extension of local democracy all concentrated on the 
disadvantaged public requiring services from government institutions. The Australian 
situation reflected the urban renewal problems found in the United States. 
The Sheraton International Hotel and the Hobart Civic Square developments were 
not aimed at providing a service for the poor. They were elite developments aimed at 
making money. The civic component of the Hobart Civic Square was an 'add-on' to a 
primarily commercial development. The Government, in the Sheraton International 
Hotel case, and the Hobart City Council, in the Civic Square case, should have 
treated their developments as special cases requiring special attention from both the 
institution's and public's perspective. Massive resources, complicated decisions and 
a reluctance to release information were features of both the case studies. Public 
reaction was noted but was not used in the decisionmaking process. The argument 
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that public comment did not have enough weight of persuasion is not relevant here. 
There was no lack of expertise in the Sullivans Cove citizens groups commenting on 
the development. According to the Literature Review they should have been 
heeded as they had expertise and knowledge relevant to the developments. 
The State Government could not use the threat of withdrawal of support to control 
the action group in the Sheraton International Hotel case study, because it hadn't 
allowed for its participation in the first place or given it support. Likewise in the 
Hobart Civic Square case study, the action group was not acknowledged to the 
extent that withdrawal of Council support would have made a difference to the 
outcome of the decisionmaking process. The action groups were consulted during 
the redesign stages of both developments but had no actual input. 
In these two case studies there appeared to be no real advantages for either the 
public or the authority in allowing public participation during the latter stages of the 
processes except as a placation exercise. In the International Hotel case the public 
comment on the compromise design made no difference to the State Government 
actions. In the Civic Square case the developers withdrew after the civic forum came 
out against the redesigned civic square but there is some doubt that it withdrew soley 
because of public opinion. 
In neither case was the public asked what it wanted. It was invited to comment at the 
end of the design process. Ideally the public should have been invited to comment at 
the very beginning before the guidelines for either development were prepared. This 
may have saved considerable expense on the developers's side and on the 
public's side. 
The Literature Review described claims that institutionalised participation tended to 
favour the institution and that outcomes were not changed, only the peripheral 
details. This was not supported by the Sullivans Cove case studies. The Sheraton 
International Hotel was exempted from the normal planning processes through 
legislation and the public lost its right to appeal the final 'compromise' development. 
The public affected the outcome of the original design quite dramatically by forcing a 
82 
change in the 'landmark' concept and design. The Hobart Civic Square proposal 
was withdrawn by the developers after public sentiment was voiced at a public 
meeting, not through formal participation procedures. The public, through formal 
processes, was only able to affect peripheral details of the winning design. 
Institutionalised public participation should be encouraged to satisfy participatory 
democratic pressures but its acceptance by the authorities should not prevent the 
development of mechanisms to deal with other participatory modes which may arise 
from time to time, such as the public meetings in both case studies. It has been 
suggested by the Victorian Council of Social Service, in a different context, that a 
dynamic theory which accepts both confrontation and consensus strategies in 
varying degrees, for different situations, or at different phases in the one situation 
should be encouraged and developed (Victorian Council of Social Services, 1981; p. 
49). 
The first hypothesis stated: 
The public has had little input into decisionmaking in the planning of 
new development in Sullivans Cove, despite appearances and an 
apparent willingness by authorities to improve public participation 
opportunities in reponse to pressure. 
The authorities did not improve public participation in response to pressure. In both 
cases the public was invited to comment on the final modified development. In 
neither case was there going to be an opportunity for the public comment to make an 
effect on the displayed design. 
In the Sheraton International Hotel case study the legislation prevented further public 
participation. The authorities can be said to have improved public participation 
opportunities because the procedure was changed from no participation to a 
participation opportunity in the final 'compromise' design but no comments were 
heeded from this formal public participation opportunity. 
There was little improvement in the Civic Square case study. Public participation was 
invited on the shortlisted proposals and the final modified design. The developer 
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withdrew after the public meeting convened by the Sullivans Cove Citizens 
Association, not after the formal participation opportunity. The public meeting was 
called in response to the very minor changes made to the original design. It had 
become obvious to the Sullivans Cove Citizens Association that formal participation 
had had little effect in changing the original design. 
There were was only one formal participation opportunity given in the Sheraton 
International Hotel case study and two in the Hobart Civic Square study. The 
demands for changes in the designs were effective only outside the formal 
participation process offered by the Hobart City Council. In both cases the impetus 
for change was brought by public meetings. There was little public input to 
decisionmaking in the planning of new development except through these public 
meetings which were unrelated to the formal processes. The authorities' perceived 
willingness to improve public participation opportunities was predominately rhetoric, 
unaccompanied by their definition of public participation. The appearance of effective 
public participation is questioned in both these cases. 
The second hypothesis stated: 
In line with Sandercock's (1978) arguments that the process may be 
more important than the product, authorities concerned with 
Sullivans Cove are ill-informed and unnecessarily defensive about 
real improvements in public participation, as people generally only 
want to be informed and 'have a ready opportunity to complain'. 
Sandercock canvassed for the need for an open planning process which humanised 
the bureaucratic system but argued against any devolution of power. An open 
planning process would ideally make planning information readily available to the 
public by taking it to the people rather than expecting the people to find it. 
Implementing techniques to facilitate public access to information would allow people 
to feel their opinions mattered and their lack of particular expertise was not a 
handicap. They may then be satisfied with access to the information and 'an 
opportunity to complain'. This was unable to be tested as information about the 
developments was not made readily available to the public. 
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The link between the level of expertise and input heeded needs to be broken. 
Planners must want to humanise the system. The ramification of not providing easy 
access to information, and giving the public an opportunity to complain, is that the 
planners are pushing the public into the arms of other experts. In Hobart the public is 
giving local planners and architects, not employed by the authorities, mandates to 
represent it, thereby allowing 'expertise' to stay the overridding factor in public 
participation processes. The public has created minor elite organisations by giving its 
support to these local 'experts'. 
These Sullivans Cove organisations do not follow the accepted theory as presented 
in current public participation literature. They did not appear to become short of 
resources, they appeared very unified in their stances, they were not coopted by the 
authorities or obviously manipulated or exploited for their skills, and they kept 
pressure on the authorities for a sustained period of time. They were consulted by 
the authorities on at least two occasions. 
The reluctance of the authorities to share decisionmaking power with these groups 
was the core dilemma for both in the Sullivans Cove examples. The developing 
authorities were hinded by the minor elite organisations with resulting cost 
escalations and project delays. The people involved in the minor elite organisations 
had to be dissatisfied with the outcome of their involvement. Future developments 
may be at greater risk of opposition from such organisations as their involvement is 
likely to be increasingly aggressive and negative. 
Churchman's research discussed the personal benefits people could gain from 
participating. She did not discuss professionals or minor elite groups. Professionals 
and professionally orientated groups would be less content with limits on the type of 
participation offered to them or by a lack of influence in the decisionmaking than 
individuals 'attempting to have a say'. The Hobart groups wanted to change the 
structure of decisionmaking process and had high expectations of competence and 
control of that process. Satisfaction was related to influencing the decisonmaking 
process and the quality of the environment, contrary to Churchman's findings which 
emphasised the importance of the process rather than the end product. It can be 
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suggested that the people in these action groups did not need to develop personal 
self-esteem or confidence from the process, or would have been particularly 
supportive of the Council's 'preferred' development just because they were part of 
the participation process. 
The third hypothesis stated: 
The reluctance of authorities to grant real improvements in public 
participation may be explained by a fear that to go a little further 
may increase the community's understanding to a degree that a 
different kind of participation is actually demanded: beyond simply 
having a say in a decision here and there to a questioning of 
democratic processes in development decisionmaking, that is, to a 
situation where the wider community itself wants to set goals for 
development, thereby widening democratic processes and seeking 
powersharing. 
This hypothesis is upheld in both case studies as evidenced by the evolution of the 
minor elite organisations which have the support of the public. This is illustrated in 
Hobart by the progession of the single issue Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee to 
the multi-issue Sullivans Cove Citizens Association and subsequently to the Citizens 
for Hobart group which claims an interest in planning and development throughout 
the greater Hobart environs not exclusively in Sullivans Cove. As predicted by the 
Alinsky model, the partial success in the Sheraton International Hotel controversy 
had been sufficient to maintain the Committee's momentum. 
There is no discussion in the literature relating the early involvement of minor elite 
groups in the participation process to their subsequent evolution. It is only conjecture 
that had the Sullivans Cove Citizens Committee/Association been involved early, its 
momentum would have subsided before extending its range of interests, as is 
presently occuring. Minor elite groups are questioning democratic processes in 
decisionmaking and are seeking powersharing regardless of Council granting 'any' 
improvements in public participation. 
These groups need further investigation and analysis as they are emerging as the 
trend in public participation for the 1990s. Improving levels of education occuring in 
86 
most Western countries are encouraging the formation of minor elite groups not only 
interested in environmental issues. This represents the challenge for the 1990s - how 
can authorities accomodate the views of these educated minority groups? 
5.2. Recommendations 
There are several factors that need to be fulfilled before effective change can occur 
in the administration, application and acceptance of institutionalised public 
participation. The most important is the political will to change. The people who wish 
to participate must be included early in the process and have their concerns fully 
recognised by the authority. This may reduce public pressure at a later stage in 
development with the consequent reduction in development costs caused by delays. 
It is in the interests of the institution to encourage public participation from an early 
stage in a development and it would appear to be in the interests of the public to use 
whatever method is offered. 
Lobbying, participating in institutionalised procedures and using confrontationist 
methods are all techniques available to the public. For the participant there is no 
guarantee that any one tactic will work. For example, joining an action group will 
show solidarity with a cause but its involvement may not change the final outcome. 
One of the most important ingredients for successful change is the attention of the 
media. If the outcome of an institution's decisionmaking process is to be changed by 
_ public input, dynamic and flexible approaches toward the institution and the media 
from the participating public seem necessary. 
The Tasmanian State Government should rectify its lack of public participation 
mechanisms. Planning legislation should be introduced to allow formal participation 
structures to be developed. Participation should be encouraged at the beginning of 
the planning process before too much money is spent on any one plan. Ideally the 
initial briefs should incorporate public input as this is the basis on which developers 
put their tenders. Some onus should be put on developers tot , incorporate public 
participation in their designs. Formal planning legislation would help this occur. A 
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levy imposed on potential developers to recoup costs incurred during this briefing 
phase would seem apropriate. 
Planning legislation should also remedy the lack of public participation in the 
preparation of planning documents. Participants were invited to respond to the final 
stages of the various planning documents prepared on Sullivans Cove during the 
1970s and 1980s. However, public participation was not extensive and did not play a 
significant role in the final drafts. The overseas experience, revealed a tendency for 
small public responses to such studies with few comments producing any noticable 
difference. This is reflected in the Tasmanian situation. The wider public was not 
aware of its opportunity to comment and any comment required considerable 
personal effort of the part of the respondent in obtaining relevant documents and 
appropriate forms for comment. " 
Additionally, as presented in the Literature Review, participation at the final stages of 
the planning process was ineffective because planners had developed 
preconceptions regarding the completed draft. They tended to react only to 
perceived expertise, with public facilities and recreation issues being the least 
affected by participants comments. Long (1975; p. 97) claimed that planning officers 
were guilty of discrimination in favour of people who already had access to channels 
of power, authority and influence. This supports the recommendation that the public 
be involved in the preparation stage of the planning documents before 
preconceptions are in place and before expertise is perceived to be paramount. 
The Sheraton International Hotel and the Hobart Civic Square were developments 
that caused considerable community debate. The case studies provided historical 
data for the thesis and related the public participation processes to the 
decisionmaking processes. The significant factor highlighted by this study is the role 
of minor elite groups. In both case studies, minor elite groups were given a mandate 
by the public to represent them. They played a dominant role in criticising the 
developments and continue to demand a greater role in decisionmaking. The role of 
minor elite organisations has not been examined in detail by contemporary authors. 
88 
The significance of their potential role was only alluded to by Alterman, Harris and 
Hill (1984; p. 183). This appears to be a major deficiency in the knowledge of public 
participation methods. More research needs to be undertaken to further understand 
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